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This Article examines the widespread use of confidential 
witnesses (“CWs”) in securities class action litigation1 following the 
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Brandeis University, Columbia University, Harvard University, New York University, and 
the University of California. 
 1. Such litigation is both common and costly. During the period of January 1996 to 
December 2017, approximately 244 securities class action cases were filed on average each 
year, excluding so-called IPO laddering cases. STEFAN BOETTRICH & SVETLANA 
STARYKH, NERA ECON. CONSULTING, RECENT TRENDS IN SECURITIES CLASS ACTION 
LITIGATION: 2017 FULL-YEAR REVIEW 2 (2018), http://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera
/publications/2018/PUB_Year_End_Trends_Report_0118_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/VLJ5
-XZS2]. “The total value of settlements approved by courts [in securities class action 
cases] in 2016 was more than $5.9 billion, almost double the amount approved in 2015.” 
LAARNI T. BULAN, ELLEN M. RYAN & LAURA E. SIMMONS, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, 
SECURITIES CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS: 2016 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 3 (2017), 
https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/Securities-Class-Action-Settlements-2016
-Review-and-Analysis [http://perma.cc/F67E-EDEL]. Securities class action litigation 
continued at a robust pace in 2017. Plaintiffs filed a record 412 federal securities class 
action cases in 2017. This number was 52% greater than in 2016 and more than double the 
1997-2016 average. So-called “core” filings (those excluding merger and acquisition 
claims) increased to 214, 15% more than in 2016. See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, 
SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS: 2017 YEAR IN REVIEW 5 (2018), 
https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/Securities-Class-Action-Filings-2017-YIR 
[https://perma.cc/JU56-3WSY]. 
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enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 
(“PSLRA”).2 CWs are current or former employees (or, less 
frequently, customers or suppliers) of the defendant company who 
provide information to plaintiffs for use in their class action 
complaints,3 typically in an effort to bolster scienter4 or falsity5 
allegations, or both.6 This information is furnished anonymously, in 
the sense that the CWs are not identified by name in the pleadings.7 
Anonymity is provided because the witnesses are fearful of retaliation 
by the defendant companies against which they are providing 
information.8 Federal courts have accepted this pleading practice in 
 
 2. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.). 
 3. In re BofI Holding Inc., Sec. Litig., No. 3:15-CV-02324-GPC-KSC, 2016 WL 
5390533, at *30–31 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2016) (“Confidential witnesses are typically current 
or former employees, customers, or suppliers, who are fearful of retaliation if their 
identities are disclosed.” (citing Gideon Mark, Confidential Witnesses in Securities 
Litigation, 36 J. CORP. L. 551, 554–55 (2011))); Jeff G. Hammel & Elizabeth R. Marks, 
Confidential Witnesses: Reliable Source or Imaginary Friend?, 45 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. 
(BNA) (July 15, 2013), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/blaw/document
/x6dbe5og000000 [http://perma.cc/R2CW-ANVT (staff-uploaded archive)] (explaining that 
CWs are “usually former company employees anonymously providing information to 
plaintiffs for use in their complaints”); Gideon Mark, Confidential Witnesses in Securities 
Litigation, 36 J. CORP. L. 551, 554–55 (2011) (describing CWs as “current or former 
employees, customers, or suppliers fearful of retaliation if their identities are disclosed”). 
 4. See, e.g., Cutler v. Kirchner, 696 Fed. App’x 809, 815 (9th Cir. 2017) (determining 
that the plaintiff successfully used allegations attributed to CW to plead scienter against 
multiple defendants); Robb v. Fitbit, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2016) 
(“Here, statements by CW 1 and CW 2 are sufficient to establish scienter.”). 
 5. See, e.g., In re Stratasys Ltd. S’holder Sec. Litig., 864 F.3d 879, 883–84 (8th Cir. 
2017) (showing that the plaintiffs sought to use CW statements only to establish falsity). 
 6. See, e.g., In re BofI Holding, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 3:15-CV-02324-GPC-KSC, 2017 
WL 2257980, at *7–13 (S.D. Cal. May 23, 2017) (concluding that information provided by 
CWs helped establish both falsity and scienter). 
 7. See Robert L. Hickok & James H. S. Levine, Confidential Witness Statements Post-
Tellabs, PEPPER HAMILTON LLP (June 29, 2010), http://www.pepperlaw.com/publications
/confidential-witness-statements-post-tellabs-2010-06-29/ [http://perma.cc/L9LB-RCBC] 
(discussing the prevalent use of statements from confidential sources in pleadings and 
explaining such statements are only secured “by ensuring their anonymity”). 
 8. See, e.g., id. (observing that the only way to secure the testimony of current or 
former employees concerned about retaliation by defendants is to ensure their 
anonymity). “Retaliation can take many different forms . . . including: being fired, socially 
ostracized, intimidated, demoralized, humiliated, demoted, or blacklisted; being denied a 
promotion, overtime, or benefits; and/or being formally disciplined, reassigned, or given a 
reduction in wages or hours.” Gideon Mark, Recanting Confidential Witnesses in Securities 
Litigation, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 575, 596–97 (2014). The risk of retaliation confronts both 
current and former whistleblowing employees. See Joel H. Bernstein & Eric D. Gottlieb, 
Developments in Securities Class Actions—Confidential Witnesses: Increasing Judicial 
Scrutiny, Discovery, and Millennial Media 2–3 (Mar. 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with North Carolina Law Review) (“Former employees, such as the vast majority of 
CWs, also can face retaliation.”); Jed S. Rakoff, Confidential Informants and Securities 
96 N.C. L. REV. 789 (2018) 
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recognition of the risk of retaliation.9 While there is some variation 
between the federal circuits, generally the use of CWs to establish 
scienter is permissible so long as: (1) the witnesses are described with 
sufficient particularity to establish their reliability and personal 
knowledge, and (2) the statements attributed to them are indicative of 
scienter.10 The required descriptions often ease the task for 
defendants to ascertain the witnesses’ identities.11 
While federal courts have accepted the use of confidential 
witnesses in securities litigation, that acceptance has been begrudging. 
Indeed, the Fifth12 and Seventh13 Circuits steeply discount (but do not 
 
Class Actions: Mixed Messages and Motives, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 571, 572–73 (2014) 
(observing that the risk of retaliation against CWs “is a genuine problem, even for former 
employees,” but adding that former employees have “a strong motive to gripe, and to 
exaggerate”). The risk of retaliation is substantial. “One study found that 82% of the 
whistleblowing population had been fired, quit their job under duress, or had significantly 
altered responsibilities, as a result of their whistleblowing activities.” See Mark, supra, at 
597. “Other surveys have found that up to two-thirds of whistleblowers lose their jobs and 
due to blacklisting, most never work in their fields of expertise again.” Id. 
 9. See, e.g., In re Cabletron Sys., Inc., 311 F.3d 11, 30 (1st Cir. 2002) (observing that 
requiring plaintiffs to name their confidential internal corporate sources would have a 
chilling effect on employees who provide “information about corporate malfeasance” 
(citing Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 314 (2d Cir. 2000))); Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 
314 (2d Cir. 2000) (“Imposing a general requirement of disclosure of confidential sources . 
. . [in complaints] could deter informants from providing critical information to 
investigators in meritorious cases or invite retaliation against them.”). 
 10. See, e.g., In re Quality Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., 865 F.3d 1130, 1144–45 (9th Cir. 2017); 
Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 995 (9th Cir. 2009); Novak, 216 F.3d 
at 314 (“[A] complaint can meet the new pleading requirement imposed by paragraph 
(b)(1) by providing . . . a sufficient general description of the personal sources of the 
plaintiffs’ beliefs.”). Plaintiffs in securities class action litigation often struggle when using 
CWs to establish scienter. See, e.g., In re Biogen Inc. Sec. Litig., 857 F.3d 34, 42–43 (1st 
Cir. 2017) (holding that CW statements fail to “give rise to strong inference of scienter”); 
In re Lifelock, Inc., Sec. Litig., 690 F. App’x 947, 953 (9th Cir. 2017) (concluding that CW 
statements “fail to create an inference of scienter more cogent or compelling than an 
alternative innocent inference” (quoting Zucco, 552 F.3d at 999–1000)); Hong v. Extreme 
Networks, Inc., No. 15-cv-04883-BLF, 2017 WL 1508991, at *19 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2017) 
(holding that statements of three CWs fail to establish scienter); Fadia v. FireEye, Inc., 
No. 5:14-cv-05204-EJD, 2016 WL 6679806, at *22 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2016) (“Upon 
review, however, it is clear that the CW statements fail to establish a strong inference of 
scienter.”). 
 11. See Leigh Handelman Smollar, The Struggle Over the Use of Confidential 
Witnesses, POMERANTZ MONITOR (Pomerantz LLP, New York, N.Y.), May–June 2014, at 
4, http://pomerantzlawfirm.com/assets/monitor/0506-2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/FRF4-
VHM7] (“Because the [PSLRA] requires plaintiffs to plead the details of the CW’s 
position and ability to know the facts alleged, the defendants often can figure out who the 
CWs are.”). 
 12. See, e.g., Ind. Elec. Workers’ Pension Tr. Fund IBEW v. Shaw Grp., Inc., 537 F.3d 
527, 535 (5th Cir. 2008) (“[C]ourts must discount allegations from confidential sources.” 
(citing Higginbotham v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 495 F.3d 753, 756–57 (7th Cir. 2007))); Izadjoo v. 
Helix Energy Sols. Grp., Inc., 237 F. Supp. 3d 492, 510 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (“Even when a 
96 N.C. L. REV. 789 (2018) 
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automatically reject) allegations from CWs. Beyond discounting, the 
use of CWs has raised a host of thorny legal issues. This Article 
considers three of those issues, all of which relate to the pre-filing 
interviews of CWs conducted by plaintiffs’ counsel and/or 
investigators. The three issues are: (1) the use by defendants of 
confidentiality, separation, and severance agreements to discourage 
or bar interviews of employees or former employees by plaintiffs’ 
counsel or investigators; (2) interview practices that give rise to 
alleged recanting by CWs; and (3) efforts by defendants to obtain 
notes of witness interviews conducted by plaintiffs’ counsel or 
investigators. 
I.  THE IMPORTANCE OF CONFIDENTIAL WITNESSES IN SECURITIES 
LITIGATION 
Before addressing the three key legal issues identified, this 
Article first considers the critical role played by CWs in securities 
litigation. Two specific aspects of the PSLRA have sparked the 
ubiquitous use of CWs in securities litigation. The first is the statute’s 
creation of an elevated bar for pleading securities fraud.14 The 
PSLRA amended the Securities Exchange Act15 to impose two strict 
pleading requirements, both of which must be satisfied in order for a 
complaint to survive a motion to dismiss. A private securities 
complaint involving an allegedly false or misleading statement must 
“specify each statement alleged to be misleading, the reason(s) why 
 
complaint sets out this type of information, the Fifth Circuit has applied Tellabs to require 
district courts to ‘discount allegations from confidential sources’ because these ‘sources 
afford no basis for drawing plausible competing inferences.’” (quoting Shaw Grp., 537 
F.3d at 535)). 
 13. See, e.g., Higginbotham v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 495 F.3d 753, 757 (7th Cir. 2007) (“It 
is hard to see how information from anonymous sources could be deemed ‘compelling’ . . . 
. Perhaps these confidential sources have axes to grind. Perhaps they are lying. Perhaps 
they don’t even exist.”); see also Doshi v. Gen. Cable Corp., 823 F.3d 1032, 1037 n.2 (6th 
Cir. 2016) (“[C]ourts often discount information provided by anonymous sources.” (citing 
Higginbotham, 495 F.3d at 756–57)); Shoemaker v. Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., No. 16-568 
(DWF/KMM), 2017 WL 1180444, at *8 (D. Minn. Mar. 29, 2017) (noting that courts 
routinely disregard the statements of CWs when deciding motions to dismiss); 
Vallabhaneni v. Endocyte, Inc., No. 1:14-cv-01048-TWP-MJD, 2016 WL 51260, at *15–16 
(S.D. Ind. Jan. 4, 2016) (“The Seventh Circuit has reacted strongly against reliance on 
confidential witnesses in securities fraud cases, noting that allegations from such witnesses 
are to be steeply discounted.” (citing Higginbotham, 495 F.3d at 757)). But cf. Leigh 
Handelman Smollar, The Importance of Conducting Thorough Investigations of 
Confidential Witnesses in Securities Fraud Litigation, 46 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 503, 510 (2015) 
(“It appears that most courts, including the Second, Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits, have 
abandoned the ‘heavily discounted’ language of Higginbotham.”). 
 14. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (2012). 
 15. §§ 78a–78qq. 
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the statement is misleading, and, if an allegation .	.	. is made on 
information and belief,	.	.	. all facts on which that belief is formed.”16 
In addition, the complaint must, with respect to each act or omission 
alleged to violate the securities laws, state with particularity facts 
giving rise to a strong inference that the particular defendant acted 
with the requisite scienter,17 which the Supreme Court has defined as 
“a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or 
defraud.”18 
The second relevant change mandated by the PSLRA is the 
imposition of an automatic stay of all discovery and other proceedings 
during the pendency of a motion to dismiss,19 absent application of 
one or two statutory exceptions. The two exceptions are when 
particularized discovery is necessary to preserve evidence or to 
prevent undue prejudice to the party seeking relief.20 Congress 
created the stay to prevent plaintiffs from commencing securities 
litigation (1) with the intent to use the discovery process to coerce 
settlements and (2) as a vehicle to conduct discovery in the hope of 
finding a sustainable claim.21 Federal courts have taken a broad view 
of both the application of the PSLRA discovery stay and the time 
when the stay comes into effect.22 If a motion to dismiss by any 
defendant is pending, discovery is stayed for the entire case, even if 
some of the claims are asserted under state law.23 The stay 
 
 16. § 78u-4(b)(1). 
 17. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A). 
 18. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 n.12 (1976). 
 19. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B). Pre-PSLRA, “defendants in federal securities cases were 
required to participate in discovery during the pendency of motions to dismiss.” Gideon 
Mark, Federal Discovery Stays, 45 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 405, 433–34 (2012). 
“Defendants could avoid discovery only by moving for a protective order, requesting a 
stay, and showing good cause under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] Rule 26(c). Such 
motions were typically denied.” Id. at 434 (footnote omitted). Post-PSLRA, discovery is 
automatically stayed. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (“In any private action arising under this chapter, 
all discovery and other proceedings shall be stayed during the pendency of any motion to 
dismiss, unless the court finds upon motion of any party that particularized discovery is 
necessary to preserve evidence or to prevent undue prejudice to that party.”). 
 20. See §§ 77z-1(b)(1), 78u-4(b)(3)(B). 
 21. See, e.g., Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 475–76 (2013) 
(citing H.R. REP. 104-369 (1995)) (explaining that private securities fraud litigation has 
been subject to abuse, including the extraction of extortionate settlements of frivolous 
claims); In re NAHC, Inc. Sec. Litig., 306 F.3d 1314, 1332 (3d Cir. 2002) (observing that 
PSLRA discovery stay was intended by Congress to prevent defendants from having to 
pay nuisance settlements in securities fraud actions). 
 22. 8A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2046.2, at 294–95 (3d ed. 2010). 
 23. See, e.g., City of Birmingham Ret. & Relief Sys. v. Armstrong, No. 16-17-RGA, 
2016 WL 880503, at *1 (D. Del. Mar. 1, 2016) (mem.) (first citing Winer Family Tr. v. 
Queen, No. 03-4318, 2004 WL 350181, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 6, 2004) (mem.); then citing 
96 N.C. L. REV. 789 (2018) 
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encompasses discovery during the pendency of motions to dismiss 
amended complaints24 and motions for reconsideration of orders on 
motions to dismiss,25 and it is of great practical significance. The 
parties in securities class action cases rarely file motions for summary 
judgment26 and less than one percent of such cases proceed to trial.27 
Consequently, the ultimate outcome of the litigation is substantially 
dependent on the resolution of motions to dismiss. If plaintiffs survive 
the motion, “their chances of a major settlement increase 
exponentially.”28 Not surprisingly, then, a motion to dismiss was filed 
in ninety-four percent of all securities class actions commenced and 
resolved during the period January 2000 to December 2017.29 Original 
complaints are often amended multiple times in securities litigation, 
typically in response to motions to dismiss, and therefore many 
months or even years can pass before discovery begins.30 This is the 
 
Spina v. Refrigeration, Serv. & Eng’g, Inc., No. 14-4230, 2014 WL 4996200, at *5 (E.D. Pa. 
Oct. 7, 2014) (mem.)) (explaining that the automatic stay on discovery under the PSLRA 
is “applicable even though some of the claims are asserted under state law”). 
 24. See, e.g., In re Finisar Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 5:11-cv-01252-EJD, 2017 WL 1549485, 
at *8 (N.D. Cal. May 1, 2017) (recognizing discovery stay pursuant to a motion to dismiss 
an amended complaint under PSLRA, but ultimately denying plaintiff’s motion for 
modification of stay as moot because motion to dismiss was denied). 
 25. See McGuire v. Dendreon Corp., No. C07-800-MJP, 2009 WL 666863, at *1 (W.D. 
Wash. Mar. 11, 2009) (rejecting plaintiff’s contention that PSLRA’s discovery stay is 
inapplicable to a motion for reconsideration); Powers v. Eichen, 961 F. Supp. 2d 233, 235–
36 (S.D. Cal. 1997); but cf. In re Leapfrog Enter., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 15-cv-00347-EMC, 
2017 WL 3263114, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 28, 2017) (declining to reinstate discovery stay in 
connection with filing of motion for leave to file motion for reconsideration). 
 26. “Motions for summary judgment were filed by defendants in 7.5%, and by 
plaintiffs in only 2.2%, of the securities class actions filed and resolved [during the period 
between January 2000 to December 2017].” BOETTRICH & STARYKH, supra note 1, at 18. 
 27. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS: 2016 YEAR IN 
REVIEW 13 (2017), https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/Securities-Class-
Action-Filings-2016-YIR [https://perma.cc/CA7V-9T6W] (reporting that during the period 
from 1997 to 2015, less than one percent of securities class action cases reached a trial 
verdict). 
 28. William S. Freeman & Catherine T. Zeng, The Trouble with ‘Confidential Witness’ 
Allegations, LAW360 (Feb. 3, 2012, 2:12 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/303826/the-
trouble-with-confidential-witness-allegations [http://perma.cc/N4GJ-DUCQ]; see also 
Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, The Supreme Court’s Impact on Securities Class 
Actions: An Empirical Assessment of Tellabs, 28 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 850, 851 (2011) (“The 
PSLRA makes the motion to dismiss the main event in securities fraud class actions.”). 
 29. BOETTRICH & STARYKH, supra note 1, at 19. With regard to those cases in which 
the motion to dismiss was decided, the following outcomes were reached: granted (38%), 
granted without prejudice (7%), partially granted and partially denied (30%), and denied 
(25%). Id. 
 30. See, e.g., Pension Tr. Fund for Operating Eng’rs v. Kohl’s Corp., 266 F. Supp. 3d 
1154, 1157 (E.D. Wis. 2017) (noting that second motion to dismiss amended securities 
fraud complaint was pending for nearly two years when case was reassigned to new judge); 
City of Pontiac Gen. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 12-cv-5162, 2015 WL 
96 N.C. L. REV. 789 (2018) 
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typical pattern because plaintiffs generally fail to have the PSLRA’s 
automatic stay lifted under either the first or second statutory 
exceptions, which, respectively, permit lifting when particularized 
discovery is necessary to preserve evidence31 or to prevent undue 
prejudice to the party seeking relief.32 
The combination of the PSLRA’s strict pleading requirements 
and discovery stay explains the CW phenomenon.33 Plaintiffs must 
plead their cases with particularity,34 but they are generally barred 
from obtaining discovery to bolster their showing of scienter and 
other allegations until after all motions to dismiss have been 
 
11120408, at *1 (W.D. Ark. June 18, 2015) (“Thus, this lawsuit has been pending more 
than three years, during which time Plaintiff has been precluded from conducting 
discovery.”); In re SemGroup Energy Partners, L.P. Sec. Litig., No. 08-MD-1989-GFK-
FHM, 2010 WL 5376262, at *1 (N.D. Okla. Dec. 21, 2010) (“Thus, this lawsuit has been 
pending more than two years, during which time plaintiffs have been almost completely 
precluded from conducting discovery.”). 
 31. See 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(b)(1) (2012); In re Merrill Lynch & Co. Research Reports 
Sec. Litig., No. 02 MDL 1484(MP), 01 CV 6881(MP), 2004 WL 305601, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 
Feb. 18, 2004) (refusing to lift stay because defendants avowed they had taken all 
necessary steps to preserve all potentially relevant electronic evidence). 
 32. See § 78u-4(b)(3)(B). A number of courts interpreting the PSLRA have defined 
undue prejudice as “improper or unfair treatment amounting to something less than 
irreparable harm.” See, e.g., Desmarais v. First Niagara Fin. Grp., Inc., No. 15-1226-LPS-
CJB, 2016 WL 768257, at *2 (D. Del. Feb. 26, 2016) (quoting Lusk v. Life Time Fitness, 
Inc., No. 15-1911 (JRT/JJK), 2015 WL 2374205, at *2 (D. Minn. May 18, 2015)); Dipple v. 
Odell, 870 F. Supp. 2d 386, 392 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (quoting Sarantakis v. Gruttadauria, No. 
02 C 1609, 2002 WL 1803750, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 5, 2002)). The most commonly asserted 
basis for a claim of undue prejudice is the existence of parallel litigation, or parallel 
criminal or regulatory investigations, which require class action defendants to produce 
documents to other plaintiffs, the government, or an investigating body. Courts usually 
reject this argument. See, e.g., Mogensen v. Body Cent. Corp., No. 3:12-cv-954-J-20JRK, 
2014 WL 12621615, at *2 (M.D. Fla. June 12, 2014) (“The mere fact that documents have 
been produced to government agencies in connection with a parallel investigation does not 
support a showing of undue prejudice.”); Kuriakose v. Fed. Home Loan Mort. Co., 674 F. 
Supp. 2d 483, 490 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2009) (refusing to lift stay where about 400,000 
documents had been produced by lead defendant during active investigations conducted 
by the SEC, the U.S. Attorney’s Office, and a U.S. House of Representatives committee); 
In re Schering-Plough Corp./Enhance Sec. Litig., No. 08-397 (DMC), 2009 WL 1470453, at 
*1 (D.N.J. May 22, 2009) (denying plaintiff’s motion to modify stay to obtain documents 
that were produced to government investigators and regulators). 
 33. See Union Asset Mgt. Holding AG v. SanDisk, LLC, 227 F. Supp. 3d 1098, 1100 
(N.D. Cal. 2017) (“The combined effect of the high scienter standard in securities fraud 
litigation and the strict PSLRA discovery stay is to place great weight at the pleading stage 
on the statements of confidential witnesses.”); Geoffrey P. Miller, Pleading After Tellabs, 
2009 WISC. L. REV. 507, 530 (noting that combination of PSLRA’s strict pleading 
requirements and stay “puts a plaintiff in a vise: the pleading rules require particularized 
allegations and a strong inference of scienter, while the discovery stay deprives the 
attorney of the conventional means to develop this information”). 
 34. § 78u-4(b)(1)(B) (“[T]he complaint shall state with particularity all facts on which 
that belief is formed”). 
96 N.C. L. REV. 789 (2018) 
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resolved.35 The result has been almost universal reliance by plaintiffs 
in securities class action complaints on information provided by 
CWs.36 In the absence of publicly available information from the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” or “Commission”) or 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) investigations, allegations based on 
such information often are the only specific allegations in a complaint 
supporting a claim of securities fraud.37 CWs, like other securities 
fraud whistleblowers, thus function to advance the underlying 
purposes of federal securities laws by protecting investors from 
corporate misconduct and promoting the integrity of financial 
markets.38 Indeed, significant evidence suggests that whistleblowers 
are much more effective than either the SEC or external auditors in 
uncovering fraud in public companies.39 
The critical function of confidential witnesses in securities 
litigation is analogous to the critical function served by the informants 
that law enforcement agencies use to investigate criminal conduct. In 
2015, it was reported that “federal law enforcement agencies [in the 
 
 35. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (“[A]ll discovery and other proceedings shall be stayed during 
the pendency of any motion to dismiss”). 
 36. See, e.g., In re BofI Holding, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 3:15-CV-02324-GPC-KSC, 2016 
WL 5390533, at *16 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2016) (“The Court is aware that confidential 
witnesses have become a staple of securities litigation.”); Douglas H. Flaum & Israel 
David, Disclosure of Confidential Witnesses in PSLRA Cases, N.Y. L.J., May 31, 2012, at 1 
(“Of the various tools employed by plaintiffs’ counsel in securities cases, few are more 
important than the use of confidential witnesses in complaints.”). 
 37. See Christopher Keller & Michael Stocker, Balancing the Scales: The Use of 
Confidential Witnesses in Securities Class Actions, 41 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 87, 88 
(2009) (“[I]n the absence of publicly available information from SEC or Department of 
Justice investigations, allegations based on information provided by confidential witnesses 
offer the ‘best hope’ of plaintiffs surviving the PSLRA pleading standards.”) (quoting 
HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL 
CORPORATE LAW § 16.101 (2d ed. 2006)); THE ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., 
SEC. LITIG. COMM., SUBCOMM. ON USE OF CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES, DIALOGUE ON 
THE CURRENT LAW AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM ON THE USE OF INFORMATION 
FROM AND THE DISCLOSURE OF THE IDENTITY OF INFORMANTS 3 (2009), 
http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20071798-UseofConfidentialSources.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/Q7YW-KL53] (“Given the restrictions of the PSLRA, informants are 
virtually the only means of obtaining non-public evidence of wrongdoing at a company 
and are often essential for avoiding early dismissal of a meritorious action.”). The 
foregoing report includes separate sections written by plaintiffs’ counsel and defense 
counsel. The foregoing quotation is taken from the plaintiffs’ section. 
 38. Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Resolving the Continuing 
Controversy Regarding Confidential Informants in Private Securities Fraud Litigation, 19 
CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 637, 666 (2010). 
 39. See, e.g., Christina Parajon Skinner, Whistleblowers and Financial Innovations, 94 
N.C. L. REV. 861, 892 (2016) (“Congress has reported that in the past four years 
whistleblowers have uncovered 54.1% of frauds in public companies, versus the 4.1% 
detected by the SEC and external auditors.”). 
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DOJ and Department of Homeland Security] used more than 16,000 
confidential informants as part of investigations into criminal 
activities and organizations.”40 Informants have been described by 
former FBI Director William Webster as “the single most important 
tool in law enforcement.”41 Many courts42 and commentators43 agree 
that confidential informants are essential criminal justice tools. CWs 
serve an analogous essential function in securities litigation.44 Not all 
plaintiffs in securities class actions rely on information provided by 
confidential witnesses,45 but their use is standard practice and it is 
common for complaints or amended complaints in such litigation to 
cite as many as twenty or more CWs.46 In short, confidential witnesses 
are a primary feature of post-PSLRA securities class actions. 
II.  CONFIDENTIALITY, SEPARATION, AND SEVERANCE 
AGREEMENTS 
This Article next addresses companies’ use of confidentiality, 
separation, and severance agreements to discourage or preclude 
interviews of their employees or former employees by plaintiffs’ 
counsel or their investigators. These agreements often include terms 
providing that the employee shall not disclose any confidential 
company information to any third party and define confidential 
 
 40. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-807, CONFIDENTIAL 
INFORMANTS: UPDATES TO POLICY AND ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE WOULD IMPROVE 
OVERSIGHT BY DOJ AND DHS AGENCIES 1 (2015). 
 41. See Ethan D. Wohl, Confidential Informants in Private Litigation: Balancing 
Interests in Anonymity and Disclosure, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 551, 554 (2007) 
(quoting ROBERT M. BLOOM, RATTING: THE USE AND ABUSE OF INFORMANTS IN THE 
AMERICAN JUSTICE SYSTEM 158 (2002)). 
 42. See Keller & Stocker, supra note 37, at 88 (“Courts have long observed that the 
U.S. system of criminal justice turns on the availability of confidential informants, and 
have vigorously defended their use.”). 
 43. See, e.g., David Artman, Note, Who’s Behind Door Number One?: Problems with 
Using Confidential Sources in Securities Litigation, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1827, 1834 
(“Confidential informants are imperative for many investigations—espionage, police 
work, and war are just a few examples.”). 
 44. See, e.g., Jed S. Rakoff, supra note 8, at 572 (describing CWs as “confidential 
informants”). 
 45. See, e.g., In re Iconix Brand Grp., Inc., No. 15 Civ. 4860 (PGG), 2017 WL 4898228, 
at *18–19 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2017) (noting absence from amended securities class action 
complaint of any statements from CWs). 
 46. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Confidential Distortion: Dealing with Confidential 
Witnesses in Securities Litigation, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Sept. 25, 2017), 
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2017/09/25/confidential-distortion-dealing-with-confidential
-witnesses-in-securities-litigation [http://perma.cc/F55S-Z8YZ]; see also Howard v. 
Liquidity Servs. Inc., 322 F.R.D. 103, 110 (D.D.C. 2017) (noting that plaintiffs’ amended 
complaint is based in part on information supplied by twenty CWs). 
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information broadly to include any information the employee learned 
during the course of his employment by the defendant company.47 
The use of such agreements is common. A 2015 survey of more than 
1,200 employees in the financial services industry in the United States 
and United Kingdom found that nine percent of those surveyed in the 
U.S. had signed or been asked to sign a confidentiality agreement that 
would prohibit reporting illegal or unethical activities to law 
enforcement or regulatory authorities.48 And “16 percent of those 
surveyed reported their company’s confidentiality policies prohibit 
the reporting of potential illegal or unethical activities.”49 This latter 
figure rose to twenty-eight percent for those respondents earning 
$500,000 or more per year.50 
While the foregoing survey was directly concerned with 
confidentiality agreements that bar reporting to law enforcement and 
regulators, these same agreements—in combination with separation 
and severance agreements—are used by companies to discourage or 
bar disclosures of illegal conduct to plaintiffs’ counsel.51 As described 
below, the judicial response to such agreements has been mixed, both 
in securities litigation and other kinds of actions. The better response 
is to treat the agreements in most cases as contrary to public policy 
and limit them accordingly. 
One of the earliest PSLRA-era cases to consider the legality of 
confidentiality and severance agreements in the context of securities 
litigation is In re JDS Uniphase Corporation Securities Litigation,52 in 
 
 47. Richard Moberly, Jordan A. Thomas & Jason Zuckerman, De Facto Gag Clauses: 
The Legality of Employment Agreements That Undermine Dodd-Frank’s Whistleblower 
Provisions, 30 ABA J. LABOR & EMP. L. 87, 108 (2014). 
 48. See ANN TENBRUNSEL & JORDAN THOMAS, UNIV. OF NOTRE DAME & 
LABATON SUCHAROW LLP, THE STREET, THE BULL AND THE CRISIS: A SURVEY OF 
THE US & UK FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY 7, 10 (2015), 
https://www.secwhistlebloweradvocate.com/pdf/Labaton-2015-Survey-report_12.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/SYR4-NXPR]. 
 49. Id. at 7. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See, e.g., Joseph H. Einstein, Confidentiality Agreements Are Not a Bar to 
Informal Witness Interviews, MEALEY’S LITIG. REP.: DISCOVERY, June 2009, at 1, 2 (“It is 
not uncommon to find that witnesses otherwise willing to provide valuable information 
may believe they are unable to do so because they are parties to confidentiality 
agreements. Such agreements come in many forms, including non-disclosure agreements 
aimed primarily at protecting trade secrets and business information; termination 
agreements; or settlements of pending claims or litigations.”); Kathryn Hastings, 
Comment, Keeping Whistleblowers Quiet: Addressing Employer Agreements to Discourage 
Whistleblowing, 90 TUL. L. REV. 495, 524 (2015) (“[E]mployees who sign legally 
unenforceable agreements may not be aware of the agreements’ unenforceability and will 
refrain from whistleblowing in belief that the restrictions are legitimate.”). 
 52. 238 F. Supp. 2d 1127 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
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which the federal district court granted plaintiffs’ motion to limit the 
scope of such agreements—primarily on public policy grounds.53 The 
court supported its conclusion in part by noting federal public policy 
in favor of whistleblowers in securities fraud cases,54 as expressed in 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s (SOX)55 provisions protecting 
whistleblowers from retaliation.56 The court acknowledged that the 
relevant SOX provision only applies to government or internal 
investigations, but added that SOX “certainly does not establish a 
public policy in favor of allowing employers to muzzle their 
employees with overbroad confidentiality agreements.”57 Several 
subsequent decisions have agreed with this fundamental conclusion 
and refused to enforce confidentiality agreements in the context of 
interviews with plaintiffs’ counsel or investigators in securities 
litigation.58 Other decisions have been less favorable to plaintiffs.59 
The reasoning of the court in JDS Uniphase is reinforced by the 
whistleblower provisions of the later enacted Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
 
 53. Id. at 1138. 
 54. Id. at 1136. 
 55. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.). 
 56. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2012). This section protects employees who report alleged 
violations relating to mail fraud, wire fraud, bank fraud, securities fraud, or any rule or 
regulation of the SEC, or any provisions of federal law relating to fraud against 
shareholders. § 1514A(a). This section also protects whistleblowing employees from, inter 
alia, discharge, demotion, suspension, threats, and harassment. Id. The remedy available 
to prevailing employees is compensatory damages, including reinstatement, back pay (with 
interest), and compensation for special damages. § 1514A(c). It can include such non-
economic items as emotional distress and reputational harm. See, e.g., Halliburton, Inc. v. 
Admin. Rev. Bd., 771 F.3d 254, 266 (5th Cir. 2014); Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Admin. 
Rev. Bd., 717 F.3d 1121, 1138–39 (10th Cir. 2013). 
 57. In re JDS Uniphase Corp. Sec. Litig., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1136. 
 58. See, e.g., Brado v. Vocera Commc’ns, Inc., 14 F. Supp. 3d 1316, 1319 (N.D. Cal. 
2014) (holding that confidentiality agreement did not bar plaintiff investors from using 
information defendant’s former employee orally conveyed to plaintiffs’ lead counsel); 
Takiguchi v. MRI Int’l, Inc., No. 2:13-cv-01183-JAD-VCF, 2013 WL 6528507, at *12 (D. 
Nev. Dec. 11, 2013) (“[T]he court finds that the [confidentiality] agreement violates public 
policy by prohibiting the discovery of possible violations of federal securities laws.”); see 
also Chambers v. Capital Cities/ABC, 159 F.R.D. 441, 445 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (noting that 
confidentiality agreements “inherently chill communications relevant to the litigation”). 
 59. See, e.g., Smilovits v. First Solar, Inc., No. CV-12-00555-PHX-DGC, 2012 WL 
6574410, at *10–11 (D. Ariz. Dec. 17, 2012) (denying without prejudice plaintiffs’ motion 
to limit confidentiality agreements, pending additional briefing and hearing); Kuriakose v. 
Fed. Home Loan Mort. Co., 674 F. Supp. 2d 483, 492 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (denying motion for 
order declaring non-participation clause in severance agreement unenforceable, in part 
because plaintiffs failed to present copy of the agreement); In re Spectrum Brands, Inc. 
Sec. Litig., No. 1:05-cv-02494-WSD, 2007 WL 1483633, at *5–6 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (denying 
motion for order limiting scope of confidentiality or severance agreements, in large part 
because plaintiffs waited to file motion until after dismissal of amended complaint). 
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Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”),60 which are 
somewhat more robust than those set forth in SOX. In any SEC 
enforcement action yielding $1 million or more in monetary 
sanctions, Dodd-Frank requires the Commission to pay between ten 
and thirty percent of the collected amount to one or more 
whistleblowers who voluntarily provided original information to the 
SEC that led to the successful enforcement of the action.61 Dodd-
Frank also prohibits employers from discriminating against 
whistleblowers in the terms and conditions of employment because 
they have provided information to the SEC or have assisted the SEC 
in an investigation or prosecution related to that information.62 This 
provision is enforceable by the SEC,63 but Dodd-Frank also allows a 
whistleblower who believes his employer has violated this provision 
to sue in federal court for reinstatement, double back pay owed, and 
fees and costs.64 Further, under Rule 21F-17, promulgated by the SEC 
in August 2011, employers are prohibited from taking any action that 
would “impede an individual from communicating directly with the 
Commission staff about a possible securities law violation, including 
enforcing or threatening to enforce, a confidentiality agreement .	.	. 
with respect to such communications.”65 
By various metrics, the Dodd-Frank whistleblower program has 
been successful. By the close of the 2017 fiscal year, the program had 
generated more than 22,000 tips and awarded approximately $160 
million to 46 whistleblowers, and that information led to successful 
SEC enforcement actions in which more than $975 million in financial 
sanctions were ordered.66 But the SEC is not merely focused on using 
tips to generate sanctions. Another priority of the Commission is the 
 
 60. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 12, 15, 22, 31, 
and 42 U.S.C.). 
 61. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b)(1). 
 62. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A). 
 63. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(b)(2) (2017). 
 64. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(C). 
 65. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-17. The SEC broadly interprets Rule 21F-17. See Matthew T. 
Martens, Arian M. June & Caroline Schmidt, Four Key Whistleblower Trends—And How 
Companies Can Prepare for Them, 49 REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 225, 228 (2016); 
David M. Stuart & Kyle S. Gazis, The SEC as the Whistleblower Program’s Advocate: 
Severance Agreements and FCPA Investigations, FCPA REP., Oct. 12, 2016, at 1, 3. 
 66. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE 
DODD-FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 1, 23 (2017); see also Amanda M. Rose, 
Better Bounty Hunting: How the SEC’s New Whistleblower Program Changes the Securities 
Fraud Class Action Debate, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1235, 1281 (2014) (“All told, it seems 
likely that the [program] will help to reduce the social harm caused by securities fraud 
through enhanced deterrence.”). 
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assessment of confidentiality, severance, and other kinds of 
agreements that stifle whistleblowing.67 In 2015 the SEC brought its 
first enforcement action against a company, KBR, Inc., for its use of 
agreements that impeded whistleblowers in violation of Rule 21F-
17,68 and in subsequent years the SEC significantly stepped up its 
enforcement efforts in this area. Between April 2015 and January 
2017, the SEC issued nine orders enforcing Rule 21F-17.69 The SEC 
brought enforcement actions against KBR, Anheuser-Busch InBev 
SA/NV, BlackRock, Inc., BlueLinx Holdings, Inc., Health Net, Inc., 
Homestreet Inc., Merrill Lynch, NeuStar, Inc., and SandRidge 
Energy, Inc.70 Some of these companies used language in 
contravention of Rule 21F-17 in hundreds of their agreements with 
employees. NeuStar, Inc., for example, used impermissible non-
disparagement clauses in at least 246 severance agreements during the 
period August 2011 to May 2015,71 and more than 500 former 
employees of SandRidge Energy, Inc. signed separation agreements 
with impermissible restrictive language.72  
The SEC continued to examine potential violations of Rule 21F-
17 in 2017, following the presidential election.73 But it is not the only 
federal agency taking an aggressive approach. In September 2016, the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”)—which 
is charged with enforcing more than twenty federal whistleblowing 
 
 67. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 66, at 6, 19–21. 
 68. See KBR, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 74619, 2015 WL 1456619, at *2–3 (Apr. 
1, 2015); see also Thomas W. White, SEC Enforcement Actions Under Exchange Act Rule 
215-17, J. INV. COMPLIANCE, 2017, at 1, 2. 
 69. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 66, at 19–20. 
 70. See id. (discussing SEC actions against HomeStreet, NeuStar, BlackRock, and 
SandRidge); SEC Announces Two Enforcement Actions Regarding Restrictive Language in 
Severance Agreements, DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP (Dec. 22, 2016), 
https://www.davispolk.com/publications/sec-announces-two-enforcement-actions-regarding
-restrictive-language-severance/ [https://perma.cc/5QSV-W899] (discussing NeuStar and 
SandRidge enforcement actions); Jay Sherwin, Whistleblower Protections Trump 
Confidentiality Provisions: SEC Enforcement of Rule 21F-17, WOODRUFF SAWYER & CO. 
(July 26, 2017), https://wsandco.com/do-notebook/whistleblower-protections-sec-rule-21f-
17/ [https://perma.cc/K4UG-QFDS] (identifying nine enforcement actions). 
 71. See NeuStar, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 79593, 2016 WL 7335658, at *3 
(Dec. 19, 2016). 
 72. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 66, at 21. 
 73. See Carmen Germaine, SEC Whistleblower Program is Business as Usual, Chief 
Says, LAW360 (June 28, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/939700/sec-whistleblower-
program-is-business-as-usual-chief-says [https://perma.cc/HP3A-PMM2] (reporting that 
SEC’s Office of the Whistleblower continues to examine severance and other employment 
agreements to ensure that employees are not prevented from reporting securities law 
violations to SEC). 
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laws74—issued new policy guidelines for its review of private 
settlement agreements presented to OSHA for approval in 
whistleblowing actions.75 These guidelines largely mirror the SEC’s 
perspective on confidentiality and severance agreements that impede 
whistleblowing.76 In May 2017, the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (“CFTC”) amended its whistleblower rules77 to more 
closely align them with the SEC’s program.78 The CFTC’s 
amendments prohibit the enforcement or threatened enforcement of 
any confidentiality agreement or pre-dispute arbitration provisions in 
pre-employment, employment, or post-employment agreements that 
might impede an individual from communicating a possible violation 
of the Commodity Exchange Act79 to the CFTC.80 The National 
Labor Relations Board and Equal Opportunity Employment 
Commission have similarly attacked confidentiality, separation, and 
release agreements that potentially discourage whistleblowing.81 
The SEC has been aggressive even absent evidence that 
companies have taken action to enforce the subject contract 
provisions or prevent employees from communicating with the 
 
 74. Locke Lord LLP, OSHA Joins SEC in Scrutinizing Separation and Settlement 
Agreements, JD SUPRA (Oct. 19, 2016), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/osha-joins-sec-
in-scrutinizing-10559/ [https://perma.cc/8BCR-4WLC]. 
 75. MARYANN GARRAHAN, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND 
HEALTH ADMIN., NEW POLICY GUIDELINES FOR APPROVING SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENTS IN WHISTLEBLOWER CASES 1 (2016). 
 76. See Sarah E. Bouchard & Thomas A Linthorst, OSHA Increases Scrutiny of 
Whistleblower Settlement Agreements, MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP (Sept. 26, 2016), 
https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/osha-increases-scrutiny-of-whistleblower-settlement-
agreements [http://perma.cc/E7BT-8RFW (dark archive)] (“The catalyst for these changes 
is the perceived use of overbroad confidentiality or nondisparagement clauses.”). Ed Ellis, 
Chip Jones & Kevin Griffith, OSHA Joins the SEC in Attacking Confidentiality and Other 
Provisions in Private Settlement Agreements, LITTLER MENDELSON P.C. (Sept. 19, 2016), 
https://www.littler.com/publication-press/publication/osha-joins-sec-attacking-confidentiality-
and-other-provisions-private [https://perma.cc/M5CW-62ED] (“The OSHA guidelines 
extend the approach recently adopted by the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission.”). 
 77. See Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC 
Strengthening Anti-Retaliation Protections for Whistleblowers and Enhancing the Award 
Claims Review Process (May 22, 2017), http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@newsroom
/documents/file/wbruleamend_factsheet052217.pdf [http://perma.cc/8KRJ-S42S]. 
 78. See Lewis Csedrik, et al., Inside the CFTC’s Enhanced Whistleblower Protections, 
LAW360 (June 9, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/932700/inside-the-cftc-s-
enhanced-whistleblower-protections [https://perma.cc/U2ML-9EA5]. 
 79. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1–27 (2012). 
 80. See Csedrik, et al., supra note 78. 
 81. See Rachel B. Cowen & Deborah R. Meshulam, Redux—Federal Agencies Attack 
Employment Agreements, and What You Can Do About It: 8 Steps to Consider, DLA 
PIPER (Aug. 18, 2016), https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publications/2015/04
/federal-agencies-attack-agreements/ [http://perma.cc/7BQU-7EWX]. 
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government. This was true, for example, with respect to the SEC’s 
enforcement actions against KBR, Health Net, and BlueLinx.82 The 
SEC has taken action because the mere existence of the clauses in 
severance and confidentiality agreements has a chilling effect on 
whistleblowing. Rule 21F-17 unambiguously provides that the mere 
existence of overly restrictive contract language can result in a 
violation.83 
The SEC’s recognition of the importance of preventing the 
chilling effect of overbroad confidentiality, separation, and severance 
agreements should help guide courts confronted with such 
agreements in private securities litigation. Courts should refuse to 
enforce agreements that restrict the ability of current or former 
employees to participate in pre- or even post-filing interviews with 
plaintiffs’ investigators or counsel. A common refusal to enforce can 
reduce the chilling effect of these agreements.84 Of course, courts 
should establish appropriate limits by upholding protection for trade 
secrets and highly sensitive customer information and by restricting 
use of the unprotected information employees provide to the pending 
litigation. Such restrictions are vital, but their use should be the 
exception rather than the norm. A recent securities class action in 
California provides a good example of the infrequent situation where 
restrictions are appropriate.85 The federal district court enforced 
confidentiality agreements in that case and required the return to 
defendant of 150 pages of highly sensitive customer information, 
including the names, addresses, telephone numbers, social security 
numbers, account balances, and tax forms provided to plaintiff by the 
former employee of defendant.86 This information merited 
protection.87 
 
 82. See Recent Whistleblower Actions by SEC and Congress Add Risk to Severance 
Agreements, PERKINS COIE LLP (Feb. 10, 2017), https://www.perkinscoie.com/en/news-
insights/recent-whistleblower-protection-actions-by-the-sec-and-congress.html [http://perma.cc
/G3GX-V2RQ]. 
 83. See SEC Brings Additional Enforcement Actions Against Companies with 
Employment Agreements that Impede Whistleblowing, SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP (Aug. 22, 
2016), http://www.sidley.com/news/sec-brings-actions-to-enforce-whistleblower [https://perma.cc
/FG38-C7Q8] (“It is important to note that the mere existence of improperly restrictive 
language can lead to a Rule 21F-17 violation.”). 
 84. See Moberly et al., supra note 47, at 89 (“Th[e] use of a confidentiality agreement 
not only punishes an employee after the whistle is blown, but also chills the willingness of 
employees to blow the whistle in the future due to the fear of being sued by a current or 
former employer.”). 
 85. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys. v. BofI Holding, Inc., No. 15cv2324 GPC (KSC), 
2017 WL 1102732, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2017). 
 86. Id. at *5. 
 87. Id. 
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In summary, companies have used confidentiality, separation, 
and severance agreements to discourage or preclude plaintiffs’ 
counsel and/or their investigators from interviewing companies’ 
employees or former employees during securities litigation. Courts 
should treat these agreements in most cases as contrary to public 
policy and limit them accordingly. Such treatment would be 
consistent with the SEC’s enforcement of Rule 21F-17 and the 
similarly aggressive approach taken by other federal agencies. 
III.  RECANTING WITNESSES 
This Article next addresses the problem of recanting confidential 
witnesses. As noted supra, the PSLRA imposes an automatic stay of 
discovery while motions to dismiss are pending.88 When the motions 
to dismiss are denied, the stay is lifted.89 In most cases defendants 
then seek discovery of plaintiffs’ confidential witnesses, primarily to 
test whether the witnesses will confirm the information attributed to 
them in plaintiffs’ complaint.90 The clear trend is for federal district 
courts to permit such discovery, over objections that it is contrary to 
public policy91 and undermines work product protection.92 When 
discovery of CWs is taken, the opportunity arises for the witnesses to 
recant, deny, or modify some or all of the information attributed to 
them by plaintiffs. In a series of recent high-profile securities fraud 
 
 88. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 89. See, e.g., In re Finisar Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 5:11-cv-01252-EJD, 2017 WL 1549485, 
at *8 (N.D. Cal. May 1, 2017). 
 90. See Carl H. Loewenson, Jr. & James J. Beha II, Reliability of Confidential 
Witnesses in Securities Fraud Complaints, N.Y. L.J. (Sept. 30, 2013), 
https://media2.mofo.com/documents/130930-reliability-confidential-witnesses-securities-fraud-
complaints.pdf [http://perma.cc/SM3J-VVE8] (“Once a case proceeds to discovery, 
however, defendants are typically able to learn the identities of confidential witnesses and 
probe the accuracy of their statements.”).  
 91. Flaum & David, supra note 36, at 2 (“Most courts, however, have found that the 
names of confidential witnesses can be disclosed despite any public policy concerns.”).  
 92. See, e.g., Fort Worth Emps.’ Ret. Fund v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., No. 09 Civ. 
3701(JPO)(JCF), 2013 WL 1896934, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2013) (mem.) (noting that in 
the Southern District of New York, “the majority view, especially more recently,” is that 
the names of CWs are not entitled to work product protection); Flaum & David, supra 
note 36, at 1 (“[T]he number of cases in which plaintiffs have managed to withhold the 
names of confidential witnesses on work product grounds is comparatively slim and 
relatively dated.”); Jennifer H. Rearden & Darcy C. Harris, Growing Trend Favors 
Disclosure of Witnesses’ Identities, SEC. LITIG., Fall 2012, at 11, 15 (“Although the case law 
is still unsettled, the growing trend requiring plaintiffs to disclose in discovery the 
identities of specific confidential witnesses referenced in their complaint seems 
unmistakable.”). 
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cases such recanting93 has occurred, or has been alleged to have 
occurred.94 The new version of events can be used by defendants to 
support a motion for summary judgment. 
A. Coercion of Recanting Statements 
While discovery of CWs can support motions for summary 
judgment, evidence of recanting often becomes available in the form 
of declarations or affidavits even before the discovery stay has been 
lifted. As noted previously, the requirement that plaintiffs be specific 
when pleading allegations about CWs often enables defendants to 
learn the sources’ identities.95 Defendants frequently contact CWs 
after making positive identifications96 and secure affidavits. In these 
situations, defendants have sought to use the affidavits to support 
motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure (“Federal Rules”),97 motions to strike under Rule 12(f),98 
motions for reconsideration of denials of motions to dismiss,99 and/or 
motions for sanctions under Rule 11.100 
There is considerable dispute about the frequency of recanting 
by CWs in securities fraud litigation. While some commentators and 
defense counsel believe that recanting is common,101 and some courts 
 
 93. “Recanting” is sometimes characterized in criminal cases as an unequivocal 
repudiation of prior testimony. See, e.g., United States v. Tobias, 863 F.2d 685, 689 (9th 
Cir. 1988). In this Article, the term is used more broadly to also include denials that 
purported statements were ever made, and modifications of prior statements. 
 94. See, e.g., In re Millennial Media, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 14 Civ. 7923(PAE), 2015 WL 
3443918, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2015); City of Livonia Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Boeing Co., 
306 F.R.D. 175, 182 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (mem.); City of Pontiac Gen. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. 
Lockheed Martin Corp., 952 F. Supp. 2d 633, 636 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (describing events in 
which, allegedly, “several of the confidential witnesses . . . had ‘recanted’ statements 
attributed to them . . . and/or had denied making such statements in the first place.”).  
 95. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 96. See Heather Speers, Confidential Witness Allegations in Securities Fraud 
Litigation, CORP. COUNSEL, Winter 2017, at 6, 9 (“Defense counsel often attempt to 
contact CWs to investigate allegations in the complaint.”). 
 97. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b); see, e.g., Union Asset Mgmt. Holding AG v. Sandisk LLC, 
227 F. Supp. 3d 1098, 1099–1100 (N.D. Cal. 2017). 
 98. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f); see, e.g., Hatamian v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., No. 14-
cv-00226-YGR(JSC), 2016 WL 2606830, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2016). 
 99. See, e.g., In re Genworth Fin., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 14 Civ. 2392 (AKH), 2016 WL 
858679, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2016). 
 100. FED. R. CIV. P. 11. See, e.g., In re BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc. Sec. Litig., 851 F. 
Supp. 2d 1299, 1309–10 (S.D. Fla. 2011). 
 101. See, e.g., Jonathan C. Dickey & Brian M. Lutz, The SEC’s Final Whistleblower 
Rules: The Floodgates Open on a New Wave of Whistleblower Claims, as the SEC 
Authorizes Massive Bounties to Anonymous Tipsters, SEC. LITIG. REP. (Gibson, Dunn & 
Crutcher LLP, New York, N.Y.), July/Aug. 2011, at 1, 6, https://www.gibsondunn.com/wp-
content/uploads/documents/publications/Dickey-Lutz-SECFinalWhistleblowerRules-
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share this belief,102 a review of recent cases suggests the true incidence 
has been exaggerated. In a number of cases the declarations 
submitted by allegedly recanting CWs reflected only immaterial 
differences between the declarations and the material attributed to 
them in plaintiffs’ complaints.103 Moreover, it seems likely that much 
 
JulyAugust2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/P9C4-8YX4] (asserting that CWs “have shown 
themselves to be far too easily coaxed by plaintiffs’ counsel or their private investigators to 
misrepresent, exaggerate, or misstate the facts”); Alison Frankel, The Confidential Witness 
Conundrum in Securities Class Actions, NAT’L LEGAL NEWS FROM REUTERS (Sept. 20, 
2012), https://1.next.westlaw.com/Document/I0fcaf310037211e2bc49ffde052dcc84/View
/FullText.html (“[T]he truth is that just about every major securities class action firm has 
seen witnesses say one thing to plaintiffs’ investigators and another to former employers 
after their identity is revealed.”); Douglas W. Greene, How to Solve the Flawed 
Confidential Witness Issue, LAW360 (Apr. 8, 2013), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/430766/how-to-solve-the-flawed-confidential-witness-issue 
[http://perma.cc/S9DG-ZZWH] (referring to the “recurring and pervasive problem” of 
flawed CW allegations, but noting that many cases involve only “garden-variety 
inaccuracies”); Kevin LaCroix, The Confidential Witness Problem in Securities Litigation, 
D&O DIARY (July 15, 2013), http://www.dandodiary.com/2013/07/articles/securities-
litigation/the-confidential-witness-problem-in-securities-litigation/ [http://perma.cc/4SNE-
4Y32] (“The pattern recurs often that after the dismissal motion is denied, and the 
witnesses’ identities are known and their testimony is questioned, the witnesses recant.”). 
 102. See, e.g., In re Millennial Media, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 14 Civ. 7923(PAE), 2015 WL 
3443918, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2015) (noting the “growing body of cases chronicling 
the repudiation by CWs of statements attributed to them in securities class-action 
complaints”). 
 103. See, e.g., In re Genworth Fin., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 14 Civ. 2392 (AKH), 2016 WL 
858679, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2016) (finding that deposition testimony and declaration of 
two CWs were somewhat inconsistent with allegations attributed to them in complaint but 
did not constitute recantations); City of Pontiac Gen. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Lockheed Martin 
Corp., 952 F. Supp. 2d 633, 637–38 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (mem.) (“[T]he only statement 
attributed to the CWs in the Amended Complaint that the Court found clearly inaccurate 
was the result, not of any mis-reporting by [the CW], but of mis-drafting by counsel.”); 
Minneapolis Firefighters’ Relief Ass’n v. Medtronic, Inc., 278 F.R.D. 454, 463–64 (D. 
Minn. 2011) (mem.) (concluding that differences between the declarations of 13 CWs and 
the allegations in plaintiffs’ amended complaint were “mostly innocuous”); Local 703, I.B. 
of T. Grocery and Food Emps.’ Welfare Fund v. Regions Fin. Corp. No. CV 10-J-2847-
IPJ, 2011 WL 12627599, at *3 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 23, 2011) (mem.) (reviewing affidavits from 
allegedly recanting CWs and the interview notes from plaintiffs’ investigator and 
concluding that “nothing in the affidavit statements of the CWs contradict[s] the 
statements in the Amended Complaint”); In re BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc. Sec. Litig., 851 
F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1312 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (finding that, with respect to five of six CWs, there 
was no basis to conclude that the allegations attributed to them in the first amended 
consolidated complaint lacked evidentiary support). In BankAtlantic the court reached a 
different conclusion with respect to the sixth CW. The court found a Rule 11 violation 
with respect to use by plaintiffs of this witness. In re BankAtlantic Bancorp, 851 F. Supp. 
2d at 1321. Because the plaintiffs cited this CW as a source of information in only five 
paragraphs of the 98-page first amended consolidated complaint, the violation was de 
minimis, and defendants were awarded only the reasonable fees and expenses they 
incurred in deposing that witness and one-tenth of the reasonable fees and expenses they 
incurred in preparing their motion for sanctions. Id. at 1321–22. 
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of the recanting that does occur is the product of coercion by 
defendants and their counsel, and/or the fear of retaliation 
experienced by confidential witnesses. Counsel for plaintiffs in 
securities class actions assert that such recanting as a result of 
pressure is quite common104 and some courts have found that 
recanting was in fact the product of pressure. An example of such a 
judicial finding is a case involving defendant Lockheed Martin 
Corporation, wherein plaintiff argued that the recanting CWs had 
changed their stories “because of financial and other pressures 
Lockheed had brought to bear upon them once they had been 
identified by name.”105 Judge Jed Rakoff’s careful post-settlement 
opinion denying Lockheed’s motion for summary judgment suggests 
that plaintiff was correct, at least in part. As the opinion notes, some 
of the CWs “felt pressured into denying outright statements they had 
actually made.”106 The opinion also notes that there was only one 
statement attributed to the CWs in the amended complaint that was 
clearly inaccurate, and that was the result of a drafting error by 
counsel that was later corrected.107 This is a clear example of a 
prominent federal judge accepting plaintiff’s argument that recanting 
was the product of pressure exerted by defendant, at least in part. 
It is frequently suggested that appropriate protective orders can 
shield those CWs in securities litigation who are fearful about their 
safety or security.108 But such orders do nothing to protect against the 
risk of retaliation. They also do nothing to guard against the pressure 
exerted by defense counsel who interrogate CWs during their 
depositions about possible breaches of their confidentiality and/or 
severance agreements.109 Under Rule 26(c)(1) of the Federal Rules, a 
protective order must be premised on good cause,110 and courts 
typically find that general statements regarding a serious risk of 
retaliation do not satisfy the standard. Rather, plaintiffs are required 
 
 104. See, e.g., LaCroix, supra note 101 (citing unidentified leading plaintiffs’ lawyer for 
proposition that “confidential witnesses always recant, because of the financial and other 
pressure their employer can bring to bear on them, regardless of how precise, specific and 
detailed their prior testimony had been”); Smollar, supra note 11, at 4 (“[F]ear of 
retaliation by the former employer accounts for most of witness recantation.”). 
 105. City of Pontiac Gen. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 952 F. Supp. 2d at 636. 
 106. Id. at 637. 
 107. Id. at 637–38. 
 108. See, e.g., Loewenson & Beha II, supra note 90. 
 109. See Frankel, supra note 101 (“[I]t’s one thing for [CWs] to talk to plaintiffs’ 
investigators. It’s another for them to stick by their allegations when their former 
employers’ lawyers start grilling them in depositions about the confidentiality provisions in 
their severance agreements.”). 
 110. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1). 
96 N.C. L. REV. 789 (2018) 
808 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96 
to make a specific showing that disclosure will cause a clearly defined 
and serious injury.111 Federal courts generally decline to find such 
injury, especially where the CW is a former employee.112 
B. Best Practices to Minimize Recanting 
There is no doubt that some share of recanting by CWs is 
genuine, in the sense that (1) there are material differences between 
what was attributed to the witness in the complaint and what he 
subsequently testifies to, and (2) such differences are not the product 
of coercion, pressure, or fear of retaliation.113 This share is unlikely to 
 
 111. See, e.g., In re Marsh & McLennan Cos. Sec. Litig., MDL No. 1744, No. 04 Cv. 
8144(SWK), 2008 WL 2941215, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2008) (holding that claimed threat 
of retaliation requires specific factual support); Brody v. Zix Corp., No. 3-04-CV-1931-K, 
2007 WL 1544638, at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 25, 2007) (holding that conclusory assertion of 
consequences to CWs if their identities were revealed “does not come close to establishing 
a genuine risk of retaliation”); Plumbers & Pipefitters Local 572 Pension Fund v. Cisco 
Sys., No. C01-20418JW, 2005 WL 1459555, at *7 (N.D. Cal. June 21, 2005) (“Plaintiffs 
have not provided any evidence indicating that there is a real fear of retaliation from 
Cisco.”); In re Aetna Inc. Sec. Litig., No. CIV. A. MDL 1219, 1999 WL 354527, at *5 (E.D. 
Pa. May 26, 1999) (denying request for protective order because plaintiffs failed to make 
specific showing that defendant “has attempted to intimidate individuals connected with 
this case or has a history of such intimidation in other cases”). 
 112. See, e.g., In re BofI Holding, Inc., Sec. Litig., 318 F.R.D. 129, 135 (S.D. Cal. 2016) 
(“Lead Plaintiff’s argument that the confidential witnesses harbor a ‘legitimate fear of 
retaliation’ is not supported by specific ‘reliable, non-conclusory’ evidence.”); Plumbers & 
Pipefitters Local Union No. 630 Pension-Annuity Tr. Fund v. Arbitron, Inc., 278 F.R.D. 
335, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (rejecting use of protective orders to guard against risk of 
retribution by CWs’ current, future, or past employers); Flaum & David, supra note 36, at 
2 (noting that courts are reluctant to find a realistic possibility of retaliation if the CWs are 
no longer employed by the defendant). In In re BofI Holding, Inc., the federal district 
judge found that defendants’ contacts with CWs “had and has the potential to . . . pressure 
confidential witnesses to give untruthful statements.” 318 F.R.D. at 135. Nevertheless, he 
held that the Rule 26(c) protective order issued by the magistrate judge was contrary to 
law as overbroad. Id. at 133. The district judge issued a much narrower order. Id. at 135–
36. 
 113. One prominent example is City of Livonia Employees’ Retirement System v. 
Boeing Co., 306 F.R.D. 175 (N.D. Ill. 2014). In that case the district court held, following 
remand from the Seventh Circuit, that plaintiffs’ counsel failed to conduct a reasonable 
pre-filing investigation, warranting Rule 11 sanctions. Id. at 183. The district court noted 
that counsel filed the original complaint before interviewing their sole CW, who was 
critical to the case. Id. at 180. Counsel filed the amended complaint and second amended 
complaint after their investigator interviewed the CW, but they never personally 
interviewed him and never attempted to verify the information he allegedly provided to 
the investigator. Id. at 181. Moreover, the investigator noted in her report that some of the 
information the CW provided was unreliable. Id. At his deposition following denial of 
defendant Boeing’s motion to dismiss the CW recanted all of the material allegations 
attributed to him in the second amended complaint. Id. at 177. Plaintiffs’ counsel met the 
CW for the first time at this deposition. Id.; see also Laura J. O’Rourke, Baker McKenzie, 
A Cautionary Tale Regarding the Use of ‘Confidential Witnesses’ in Pleadings, LEXOLOGY 
(Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=0fc50900-e8dd-44d5-
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be de minimis, and it continues to vex litigants, counsel, and judges. 
Various solutions to the problem have been proposed, and they are 
discussed below. 
One major factor likely contributing to the recanting problem is 
that plaintiffs’ counsel typically delegates to investigators the task of 
interviewing confidential witnesses.114 From an ethical perspective, 
there is nothing improper about such a delegation. Rule 11 imposes 
an affirmative duty on an attorney signing any pleading or motion to 
conduct an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances into whether 
factual contentions have evidentiary support,115 and the PSLRA 
requires counsel to conduct a more diligent pre-filing investigation in 
cases involving securities fraud than in other cases116—in part because 
“the mere filing of a broad, class action securities complaint is a 
market relevant event for any reputable company.”117 Counsel’s non-
delegable duty to investigate does not extend to personally gathering 
the facts,118 but the use of investigators may multiply the risk of error. 
Any witness, confidential or not, may speculate, recount hearsay, or 
provide opinions, rather than facts, and an investigator may mistake a 
witness’ conjecture for fact.119 Subsequently, when the investigator 
 
a4b1-50a2fe99b83f [perma.cc/34HL-BRF2] (“[A] reasonable take-away from [Boeing] for 
any counsel that may utilize investigators and confidential witnesses is that the ‘ostrich’ 
approach can be sanctionable, and that more is required.”). 
 114. See Charles Davidow et al., Best Practice for Dealing with Confidential Witness 
Allegations in Securities Fraud Complaints: The Implications of In re Millennial Media and 
Other Recent Decisions, 47 Sec. Reg. L. Rep. (BNA) (July 27, 2015), 
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/blaw/document/XFNL9BD8000000 [https://perma.cc
/CH3Q-N3YZ (staff-uploaded archive)] (“The witness accounts are commonly collected 
by hired investigators or junior personnel in the office of plaintiffs’ counsel.”); see also 
Bolling v. Gold, No. C13-0872JLR, 2015 WL 6870617, at *6–7 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 9, 2015) 
(citing with approval cases criticizing failure of plaintiffs’ counsel in securities fraud 
litigation to personally interview CWs or confirm accuracy of CWs’ purported statements 
to investigators). 
 115. FED. R. CIV P. 11(b). 
 116. Auto. Ind. Pension Tr. Fund v. Textron Inc., 682 F.3d 34, 40 (1st Cir. 2012) 
(observing that PSLRA “leaves a plaintiff’s counsel with a greater than usual burden of 
investigation before filing a securities fraud complaint”). 
 117. City of Livonia Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Boeing Co., 306 F.R.D. 175, 180 (N.D. Ill. 
2014). 
 118. In re Millennial Media, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 14 Civ. 7923(PAE), 2015 WL 3443918, 
at *11 (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2015) (“To be clear, Rule 11’s command that counsel conduct 
‘an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances’ does not require counsel personally to 
participate in an initial witness interview. It is, of course, permissible and customary, not to 
mention economical, for facts to be gathered first by investigators.”) (quoting In re 
BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc. Sec. Litig., 851 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1311 (S.D. Fla. 2011)). 
 119. Id. at *12 (“[T]he investigator may have mistaken hearsay, opinion, or conjecture 
for facts, or the investigator’s interview memo may not have carefully distinguished 
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transmits his interview notes or summary to plaintiffs’ counsel, this 
may result in the drafting of complaints that fail to reflect the CWs’ 
factual, personal knowledge. Of course, counsel could just as easily as 
their investigators improperly interpret, infer, and/or extrapolate, 
based on information provided to them by a CW. But the risk of error 
(and subsequent recanting) is likely magnified when only the 
investigator conducts the witness interview. 
What interview practices should plaintiffs’ counsel and their 
investigators employ in order to minimize the risk of recanting? In In 
re Millennial Media, Inc. Securities Litigation,120 one of the most 
prominent cases involving CW recanting, Judge Paul Engelmayer 
issued guidance in dicta, and most of it appears practical. First, when 
plaintiffs’ investigator—rather than plaintiffs’ counsel—conducts the 
CW interview, counsel should independently confirm the accuracy of 
the investigator’s memorandum of the witness interview.121 This is 
sensible, although not necessarily feasible. In many cases, plaintiffs 
delegate the interview task to investigators because whistleblowing 
witnesses are reluctant to speak with counsel,122 a particular CW is 
less significant, or an attorney is unavailable. If a CW will speak freely 
only with investigators in the pre-filing stage of the litigation, and that 
CW is the only known source of the information attributed to him—
which he very often is123—then it is not always clear that confirmation 
or corroboration can occur. This can be problematic for plaintiffs, 
because some federal courts expressly require that information 
attributed to a CW in a complaint be corroborated.124 
 
between them.”). See generally Loewenson & Beha II, supra note 90 (emphasizing the 
doubt cast on CW testimony by numerous courts). 
 120. No. 14 Civ. 7923(PAE), 2015 WL 3443918 (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2015). 
 121. Id. at *12. Accord Lopez v. Ctpartners Exec. Search, Inc., 173 F. Supp. 3d 12, 31 
n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). 
 122. See Smollar, supra note 13, at 505 (“CWs often do not wish to be embroiled in any 
kind of litigation or to talk to lawyers, especially when the discussion revolves around the 
alleged fraud committed by their former employer while he or she was employed there.”). 
 123. Michael B. Eisenkraft, Dealing with Confidential Witness Recantation Statements, 
LAW360 (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/883453/dealing-with-
confidential-witness-recantation-statements [https://perma.cc/Y42E-J6YZ] (noting that in 
the absence of discovery, CWs “are often the only sources of information as to what the 
defendants knew and when they knew it”). 
 124. See, e.g., In re Daou Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., 411 F.3d 1006, 1015 (9th Cir. 2005); In re 
Huffy Corp. Sec. Litig., 577 F. Supp. 2d 968, 993 (S.D. Ohio 2008). Cf. Smollar, supra note 
13, at 519–20 (“The key to avoiding sanctions is [for plaintiffs] to ensure that there is 
corroborating evidence to the CW statements.”). But cf. Zaghian v. Farrell, 675 F. App’x. 
718, 720 n.1 (9th Cir. Jan. 12, 2017) (noting that allegations attributed to CW were 
sufficiently particular, without expressly requiring corroboration); John H. Henn, Brandon 
F. White & Matthew C. Baltay, Anonymous Sources in Securities Class Action Complaints, 
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Setting aside the foregoing concerns, how could this best practice 
be enforced? One mechanism would be for a court to request a 
certification by plaintiffs’ counsel that he or she has contacted each 
CW and obtained confirmation from the witnesses of the essential 
allegations attributed to them. “Absent such a certification, the court 
could find that it is unable to draw any reliable inferences from the 
allegations” attributed to the CWs,125 or at least substantially discount 
such allegations.126 Certification alone would not preclude defendants 
from seeking to obtain recanting declarations, but this possibility 
could be minimized if plaintiffs’ counsel hire independent counsel for 
their CWs. This would preclude direct communication between 
defense counsel and the CWs, except in the presence of independent 
counsel, and likely reduce both the pressure for CWs to recant and 
the threat of retaliation against them.127 
Second, Judge Engelmayer suggested that plaintiffs’ counsel 
should notify witnesses in advance that they will be identified as CWs 
in publicly filed complaints and this designation exposes them to the 
risk of identification by name.128 Engelmayer characterized this 
suggestion as one reflecting basic decency, rather than one informed 
by case law or an ethics canon,129 although elsewhere in his opinion he 
stated that “it is a best practice—if not an ethical imperative—for 
counsel, before designating a person as a CW in a Complaint, to 
notify that person of counsel’s intent to do so.”130 Whether as a best 
practice or an ethical requirement, the provision of notice should 
become the norm.131 Notice would enable potential witnesses to make 
better-informed decisions as to whether to become CWs and 
simultaneously reduce the risk of recanting. 
 
38 REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 131, 136 (2005) (suggesting that Daou’s addition of a 
corroboration requirement was unintended). 
 125. Coffee, Jr., supra note 46. 
 126. See Kevin LaCroix, Addressing the Use of Confidential Witnesses in Securities 
Litigation, D&O DIARY (Oct. 8, 2017), http://www.dandodiary.com/2017/10/articles
/securities-litigation/addressing-use-confidential-witnesses-securities-litigation/ [perma.cc
/JFB9-VMU9] (suggesting use of substantial discounting in absence of certification). 
 127. Coffee, Jr., supra note 46. 
 128. In re Millennial Media, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 14 Civ. 7923(PAE), 2015 WL 3443918, 
at *13 (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2015). Accord Lopez v. Ctpartners Exec. Search, Inc., 173 F. 
Supp. 3d 12, 31 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). 
 129. In re Millennial Media, 2015 WL 3443918, at *13–14. 
 130. Id. at *1. 
 131. See Smollar, supra note 13, at 524 (“Plaintiffs’ attorneys need to make sure to 
disclose to the CW that his or her testimony is not confidential.”); Speers, supra note 96, at 
7 (“Additionally, plaintiffs’ counsel should ensure that each interviewee is notified of 
counsel’s intent to designate him or her as a CW and that such designation may result in 
the public disclosure of the witness’s name.”). 
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Third, Judge Engelmayer suggested that when an investigator 
conducts a witness interview telephonically, either a colleague of the 
investigator should join the call or the call should be recorded.132 In 
fact, plaintiffs’ investigators in securities fraud litigation do tend to 
interview CWs telephonically, taking notes contemporaneously with 
the interview, rather than conducting the interviews face-to-face.133 
There may be several explanations for this, including expense and 
exigency.134 Recording telephonic interviews may not always be an 
option, given that some jurisdictions prohibit the taping of telephone 
conversations without the consent of all parties to the call,135 but 
investigators should seek consent. Where there is no recording, the 
investigator should be joined on the call by at least one other 
colleague.136 Both recordings and joint calls can help reduce the 
incidents of recanting, by corroborating the lead investigator’s 
accounts of the witnesses’ statements. 
Plaintiffs’ counsel would be wise to comply with Judge 
Engelmayer’s suggested procedures. The opinion is the first to set 
forth guideposts for conducting acceptable CW interviews and 
counsel failing to adhere to this guide run the risk, at least in his 
courtroom, of losing motions to permit discovery of CWs before 
motions to dismiss are resolved.137 The Southern District of New 
 
 132. In re Millennial Media, 2015 WL 3443918, at *6 n.4. This third suggestion echoes 
comments made by Judge Rakoff two years earlier in the Lockheed case. See City of 
Pontiac Gen. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 952 F. Supp. 2d 633, 637 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (noting that the investigator’s testimony “revealed that his interview 
practices were less rigorous than would have been typical of, say, a federal law 
enforcement agent; for example, he did not ask any other member of his staff to be with 
him on his phone calls with the CWs, nor did he ask the CWs if he could tape-record the 
calls or meet with them in-person, preferring to rely, instead, on his non-stenographic 
notes of the telephone conversations made even while the conversations were 
continuing.”). 
 133. Smollar, supra note 13, at 504. 
 134. See id. at 511 (“Investigators must be allowed to talk to these witnesses whenever 
and wherever they can.”). 
 135. See Carol M. Bast, Conflict of Law and Surreptitious Taping of Telephone 
Conversations, 54 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 147, 148 (2010) (“Although the federal 
government and a majority of states allow surreptitious taping of a telephone conversation 
with one-party consent, this practice violates state statutes in ten states.”). 
 136. See Gregory A. Markel et al., Practice Note, Securities Litigation: Defending 
Against Confidential Witness Allegations, THOMSON REUTERS PRACTICAL LAW 
http://us.practicallaw.com/w-000-6239?source=relatedcontent [https://perma.cc/E6FA-
E2M4 (staff uploaded archive)] (stating that best practices for plaintiffs include (1) having 
at least two individuals participate in any interviews of CWs, (2) the investigator or 
counsel meeting the CW in person, rather than solely over the phone, and (3) requesting 
permission to record the interview). 
 137. See Davidow et al., supra note 114 (“Following Millennial Media, if plaintiffs’ 
counsel failed to comply with any of Judge Engelmayer’s procedures in obtaining the 
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York, where Judge Engelmayer sits, is the locus of many securities 
class action filings. Even if other district court judges fail to expressly 
endorse his approach, counsel would be wise to accept it voluntarily. 
His suggestions offer the opportunity to minimize the widespread 
problem of alleged CW recanting in securities litigation. 
Competing proposals to deal with the recantation problem seem 
ill-advised. One suggestion, publicly offered by defense counsel for 
Millennial Media in the securities litigation, is that Congress should 
amend the PSLRA to require plaintiffs, through their counsel, to file 
sworn certificates stating they have confirmed the accuracy of any 
CW statements used in the complaint and have notified any quoted 
individuals that they may be witnesses at trial.138 This is not a radical 
suggestion, given that the PSLRA already requires plaintiffs to file 
sworn certifications stating, inter alia, that they have reviewed the 
complaint, authorized its filing, and are willing to act as 
representative plaintiffs.139 But it does seem designed primarily to 
chill the willingness of CWs to assist plaintiffs and their counsel. 
Requiring notice to CWs that they may be trial witnesses seems like 
an intimidation tactic, especially since so few securities class actions 
actually do proceed to trial. 
A second proposal, also from the defense bar, is that courts 
should require complaints in securities cases to include factual 
allegations about the experience and reliability of the investigators 
that plaintiffs use, or about the pre-filing investigation itself.140 This 
requirement appears both unnecessary and unduly burdensome. It is 
unclear what kind of allegations would suffice as to the reliability of a 
plaintiff’s investigator, and mandating that a complaint include a 
detailed description of plaintiff’s pre-filing investigation risks the 
forced disclosure of attorney work product. 
A third proposal, again from the defense bar, is that plaintiffs’ 
counsel “be required to obtain from each [CW] a declaration and/or a 
certification that he or she has read the complaint and agrees with the 
 
confidential witness statement, a court may be more likely to grant a motion for discovery 
into the confidential witness allegations pre-motion to dismiss, or at least to be sensitive to 
these issues in considering a motion to dismiss.”). 
 138. See Lyle Roberts, Time for Securities Lawyers to Stand Behind Their ‘Confidential 
Witnesses,’ FORBES (Aug. 19, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2016/08/19
/time-for-securities-lawyers-to-stand-behind-their-confidential-witnesses/#e3a9205a6e04 
[https://perma.cc/7THM-34L6] (“It is time for Congress to close the ‘confidential witness’ 
loophole.”). 
 139. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(2)(A) (2012). 
 140. See Loewenson & Beha II, supra note 90. 
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description of the information he or she provided.”141 According to 
one proponent of this requirement, it “would prevent most CW 
problems, and make the ones that do arise much easier to resolve.”142 
While it may be true that many CWs with accurate information to 
offer would want to provide a certification to avoid the disruption 
that can result if a complaint fails to accurately reflect the witness’ 
account,143 there could be a chilling effect on many other witnesses 
who are reluctant to sign formal documents under oath.144 Moreover, 
the proposal creates logistical complications. Requiring plaintiffs’ 
initial case filings to include sworn declarations from the CWs 
referenced in the complaint “defeats the purpose of having 
‘confidential’ witnesses.”145 If the certifications are to be filed 
contemporaneously with the filing of the complaint, they would have 
to be filed under seal and made inaccessible to defendants in order to 
preserve the CWs’ anonymity at the pleading stage of litigation. 
Otherwise, defendants could unmask CWs simply by accessing their 
signed declarations, which would elevate the substantial risk of 
retaliation. 
Other problems would arise where a CW is identified by 
defendants who submit a recanting declaration during the pendency 
of a motion to dismiss or a motion for reconsideration following 
denial of a motion to dismiss. Submission of a recanting declaration, 
followed by unsealing of the CW’s certification, would require the 
court to (1) improperly consider extrinsic evidence, (2) make an 
improper credibility determination, and (3) permit a violation of the 
PSLRA’s stay of discovery and other proceedings. First, it is well 
established that in general courts are barred from considering 
extrinsic evidence when deciding motions to dismiss.146 Recanting 
declarations should be encompassed by this prohibition.147 Second, 
 
 141. Greene, supra note 101. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Smollar, supra note 11, at 4 (“[A]ny requirement that former employees sign a 
formal legal document, especially under oath, would have a chilling effect on their 
willingness to reveal what they know.”). 
 145. Smollar, supra note 13, at 510. 
 146. See FED. R. CIV P. 12(b); see also In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 
F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997) (“As a general matter, a district court ruling on a motion to 
dismiss may not consider matters extraneous to the pleadings.”); Pension Benefit Guar. 
Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993) (“To decide a 
motion to dismiss, courts generally consider only the allegations contained in the 
complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint and matters of public record.”). 
 147. See Eisenkraft, supra note 123 (“[R]ecantation affidavits from confidential 
witnesses are no different than any other extrinsic evidence and cannot be considered on a 
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whether a recanting CW did make statements attributed to him in a 
complaint is essentially a credibility question,148 and a motion to 
dismiss is not the proper vehicle to test the credibility of witnesses. 
The Supreme Court has been clear that credibility assessments are 
within the purview of the ultimate trier of fact.149 Accordingly, courts 
should decline to consider affidavits or declarations from recanting 
CWs when deciding motions to dismiss or motions to reconsider 
denials of motions to dismiss. Third, as noted previously, the PSLRA 
requires that “all discovery and other proceedings” be stayed pending 
any motion to dismiss150 and courts have tended to interpret this 
provision broadly. As such, the submission of a declaration from a 
recanting CW during the pendency of a motion to dismiss may 
constitute discovery or other proceedings, and thus fall within the 
ambit of the PSLRA’s stay. Several courts have so held.151 Other 
 
motion to dismiss when every allegation must be taken as true.”). Less clear-cut are 
motions for reconsideration following the denial of motions to dismiss. In securities 
litigation, where the PSLRA establishes a high scienter pleading standard, some courts 
will consider extrinsic evidence—including CW recanting declarations—on motions for 
reconsideration if a manifest factual error was made by the court when deciding the initial 
motion to dismiss. This may be limited to situations where the error was based on fraud by 
the plaintiff, carelessness by plaintiff’s counsel in making its factual allegations, or by the 
court’s own misperception of the facts. See Belmont Holdings Corp. v. SunTrust Banks, 
Inc., 896 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1220–24 (N.D. Ga. 2012); see also City of Livonia Emps.’ Ret. 
Sys. v. Boeing Co., 711 F.3d 754, 759–60, 761 (7th Cir. 2013) (affirming dismissal of action 
following successful motion for reconsideration that included deposition testimony from 
CW that he had no personal knowledge of facts attributed to him in complaint); John D. 
Pernick & Ryan D. Nassau, Testing and Attacking Confidential Witness Allegations at an 
Early Stage, AM. BAR ASS’N SEC. LITIG. COMM. (Mar. 20, 2014), 
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/securities/articles/winter2014-0314-testing-
attacking-confidential-witness-allegations-at-an-early-stage.html [https://perma.cc/7S8S-
EXMH] (“For the most part, courts are reluctant to consider disputes regarding the 
accuracy of CW allegations in the context of a motion to dismiss, although they seem to be 
more receptive to such evidence in the context of a motion for reconsideration.”). 
 148. See In re BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc. Sec. Litig., 851 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1312 (S.D. 
Fla. 2011) (“Whether the confidential witnesses initially made the statements attributed to 
them in the complaints is essentially a credibility question.”); Wu Group v. Synopsis, Inc., 
No. C 04-3580 MJJ, 2005 WL 1926626, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2005) (“[W]hether the 
[CW] statements were made is essentially a credibility question.”). 
 149. See, e.g., Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 328 (2007) 
(stating that it is “within the jury’s authority to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve 
any genuine issues of fact, and make the ultimate determination whether [defendants] 
acted with scienter”). 
 150. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2012). 
 151. See, e.g., In re ProQuest Sec. Litig., 527 F. Supp. 2d 728, 740 (E.D. Mich. 2007) 
(concluding that by seeking and obtaining a declaration from a CW during the pendency 
of a motion to dismiss, defendant ProQuest “engaged in discovery which was wholly 
improper”). In Union Asset Management. Holding AG v. SanDisk LLC, 227 F. Supp. 3d 
1098 (N.D. Cal. 2017), defendant SanDisk tried to finesse the issue by submitting a 
recanting declaration ostensibly to support its request to deny leave to amend, rather than 
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courts have held that the PSLRA’s automatic stay does not 
encompass investigatory interviews conducted during the pendency of 
a motion to dismiss,152 but those cases can be distinguished, at least in 
part because they did not involve submission to the court of recanting 
affidavits.153 They merely involved interviews of prospective 
witnesses.154 Overall, the proposal that plaintiffs’ counsel be required 
to obtain from each of their CWs a declaration and/or a certification 
that he has read the complaint and agrees with the description of the 
information he has provided seems unwise. 
Some of the reasons set forth above also undermine yet another 
approach to the problem of recanting witnesses—permitting their 
depositions during the pendency of motions to dismiss. This approach 
has been endorsed in dicta by the Second Circuit, in Campo v. Sears 
Holding Corp.155 Many defense lawyers expected and hoped that 
Campo would initiate a trend.156 It did not,157 and that is appropriate, 
because Campo’s dicta missed the mark. Post-Campo, those courts 
considering the issue have rejected attempts to depose CWs prior to 
resolving motions to dismiss, in part because the PSLRA’s automatic 
discovery stay prohibits the taking of such depositions during the 
 
in direct support of its motion to dismiss. Id. at 1099. The district court properly rejected 
this end-run, by granting plaintiff’s motion to strike the recanting declaration and denying 
SanDisk’s motion to dismiss. Id. at 1099–1101. Other courts have disagreed, and relied on 
recanting declarations to dismiss securities cases with prejudice, following reconsideration 
of the denial of motions to dismiss. See, e.g., Belmont Holdings Corp. v. SunTrust Banks, 
Inc., 896 F. Supp. 2d, 1210, 1220–21 (N.D. Ga. 2012) (CW submits multiple declarations 
contradicting statements attributed to him in amended complaint and denying having ever 
made such statements to plaintiffs’ investigators). 
 152. See, e.g., In re JDS Uniphase Corp. Sec. Litig., 238 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1134 (N.D. 
Cal. 2002) (holding that plaintiff’s proposed interviews with former employees were not 
within the scope of discovery because “[n]either the former employees nor the defendants 
[were] required to participate in these interviews in any way”); In re Tyco Int’l Ltd. Sec. 
Litig., No.00-MD-1335-B, 2001 WL 34075721, at *2–3 (D.N.H. Jan. 30, 2001) (holding that 
a voluntary interview of Tyco’s former employee was not within the scope of discovery 
because “[t]here is not the slightest hint in the congressional record that the discovery stay 
was intended to apply to either parties’ own investigation”). 
 153. See JDS Uniphase, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1133–34; Tyco, 2001 WL 34075721, at *2–3.  
 154. See JDS Uniphase, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1133–34; Tyco, 2001 WL 34075721, at *2–3.  
 155. 371 F. App’x 212, at 216 n.4 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 156. See Bryan B. House, The Fact Pattern Behind the Boeing Class Action Grounding, 
LAW360 (Apr. 2, 2013, 12:02 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/429130/the-fact-pattern-
behind-the-boeing-class-action-grounding [https://perma.cc/78FL-7AMT]; see also Joseph 
C. Weinstein & Joseph P. Rodgers, Unmasking Confidential Witnesses?, LAW360 (June 23, 
2010, 11:59 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/172877/unmasking-confidential-
witnesses [https://perma.cc/GU3F-KB4R (staff uploaded archive)] (“Many securities 
litigators believe Campo is a step in the right direction.”). 
 157. See Pernick & Nassau, supra note 147 (“Other courts have been reluctant to 
follow Campo.”). 
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pendency of motions to dismiss.158 Campo’s approach also violates 
Rule 12(b), which generally prohibits consideration of material 
beyond the pleadings in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.159 
In summary, recanting CWs are a significant recurring problem 
in securities litigation, even though the incidence of genuine recanting 
has been overstated. The root of the recanting problem can be traced 
to the manner in which these individuals are interviewed pre-filing by 
plaintiffs and their investigators. Judge Engelmayer set forth some 
best practices for handling such interviews, and they appear to be 
both practical and preferable to the competing proposals most often 
publicized by defense counsel.160 
IV.  DISCOVERABILITY OF CW INTERVIEW NOTES 
A third contentious aspect of CW interviews by plaintiffs’ 
counsel and/or investigators is whether notes of those interviews are 
discoverable. Defendants may seek discovery of interview notes for 
multiple reasons, both disclosed and undisclosed. The reasons may 
include the opportunity to discover evidence that impeaches the CWs 
or evidence that tends to reveal plaintiff’s litigation strategy. As 
discussed below, plaintiffs generally resist discovery, often by 
claiming work product protection. 
The discoverability issue has numerous prongs. The first is 
whether interview notes enjoy work product protection. As to this, 
“[c]ourts have consistently held that notes and memoranda .	.	. with 
respect to a witness interview ‘are opinion work product entitled to 
 
 158. See, e.g., Belmont Holdings Corp. v. SunTrust Banks, Inc., 896 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 
1217 n.6 (N.D. Ga. 2012); In re St. Jude Med., Inc. Sec. Litig., 836 F. Supp. 2d 878, 912 n.15 
(D. Minn. 2011); In re Cell Therapeutics, Inc. No. C10-414MJP, 2010 WL 4791808, at *2 
(W.D. Wash. Nov. 18, 2010). 
 159. In re Cell Therapeutics, 2010 WL 4791808, at *2 (“The only permissible way under 
the FRCP’s [sic] to consider extrinsic evidence such as Defendants propose is to convert 
Defendants’ pending motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment.”). Cf. In re St. 
Jude Medical Inc. Sec. Litig., 836 F. Supp. 2d at 901 n.9 (expressing doubt about the 
propriety of addressing factual accuracy of an affidavit submitted by a CW in connection 
with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion). 
 160. Judge Engelmayer’s recommended best practices may be gaining traction. In July 
2017, the Duke Law Center for Judicial Studies sponsored a conference on “Emerging 
Issues in Securities Class Actions” that was limited to invited federal judges and 
prominent securities lawyers. See Coffee, Jr., supra note 46; Emerging Issues in Securities 
Class Actions, DUKE LAW, https://law.duke.edu/judicialstudies/conferences/july2017/ 
[https://perma.cc/Z926-GZC7]. The purpose of the conference was to lay the groundwork 
for the adoption of bench-bar best practices in six aspects of securities litigation, the first 
of which was the use of confidential witnesses. Id. 
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almost absolute immunity.’”161 This is true whether or not the witness 
is an employee of the defendant.162 Defendants sometimes try to 
undercut this consistent holding by arguing that they seek the 
production of interview notes reflecting facts learned by plaintiffs 
during CW interviews, and neither the attorney-client privilege nor 
the work product doctrine protects underlying facts.163 But this 
argument should generally fail, because it is rarely feasible to separate 
the purely factual components of interview notes from that portion 
reflecting the attorneys’ mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or 
legal theories.164 
A separate but related prong is whether notes of interviews 
conducted by plaintiffs’ investigators enjoy the same degree of 
protection extended to notes of interviews conducted by plaintiffs’ 
counsel. The issue is important because, as noted, CW interviews are 
frequently conducted by investigators. This phenomenon is not 
unique to class action securities litigation. Attorneys often must rely 
on the assistance of investigators and other agents during litigation in 
a broad spectrum of subject areas. Courts have recognized this 
necessity and have held that the work product doctrine protects both 
materials prepared by agents for the attorneys and those prepared by 
the attorney for himself.165 Agents whose materials prepared in 
 
 161. Murphy v. Kmart Corp., 259 F.R.D. 421, 428 (D.S.D. 2009) (quoting Baker v. 
Gen. Motors Corp., 209 F.3d 1051, 1054 (8th Cir. 2000)); see also Hickman v. Taylor, 329 
U.S. 495, 511 (1947) (noting that work product may include facts and theories reflected in 
interviews); Buck v. Indian Mountain Sch., No. 15 CV 123 (JBA), 2017 WL 421648, at *3 
(D. Conn. Jan. 31, 2017) (finding that the attorney’s “notes of witness interviews, which 
include his mental impressions and thought processes, are protected work-product”). 
 162. See Michaelbrent Collings, Discoverability of Attorney Interview Notes, L.A. LAW. 
Dec. 2006, at 12, https://www.lacba.org/docs/default-source/lal-back-issues/2006-issues
/december-2006.pdf [https://perma.cc/HWP9-7VLJ] (“[T]he standing or status of a witness 
does not seem to matter in the determination of whether attorney notes are 
discoverable.”). 
 163. See Gucci Am., Inc. v. Guess?, Inc., No. 09 Civ. 4373(SAS)(JLC), 2010 WL 
2720015, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 9, 2010). 
 164. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(B); see Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 399 
(1981) (“Forcing an attorney to disclose notes and memoranda of witnesses’ oral 
statements is particularly disfavored because it tends to reveal the attorney’s mental 
processes”); SEC v. NIR Grp., LLC, 283 F.R.D. 127, 135 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (denying 
motion to compel disclosure of witness interview notes, because attorney’s mental 
impressions in notes “cannot be adequately extricated from the facts”). 
 165. Gucci Am., Inc. v. Guess?, Inc., 271 F.R.D. 58, 74 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (citing United 
States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238–39 (1975)). Accord NIR Grp., LLC, 283 F.R.D. at 134 
(“The work product privilege protects documents produced by staff working at an 
attorney’s direction, in addition to those prepared by the attorney herself.”). 
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anticipation of litigation are protected by the work product doctrine 
include investigators.166 
A third prong concerns the requisite showing by defendants to 
overcome the work product protection extended to CW interview 
notes created by plaintiffs’ counsel and investigators. Work product 
may be subject to disclosure upon an adverse party’s demonstration 
of substantial need for the materials and undue hardship in obtaining 
the substantial equivalent.167 Defendants in class action securities 
litigation sometimes argue that they have substantial need for CW 
interview notes to confirm the veracity of certain allegations set forth 
in the complaint, or because CWs allegedly have recanted certain 
allegations attributed to them.168 This argument should fail in most 
cases, insofar as CWs typically can be deposed once the PSLRA 
discovery stay is lifted and their availability for deposition 
undermines a claim of substantial need for work product material. As 
noted by one federal district court, “the party seeking discovery can 
ask the witness himself about the events in issue, and, if the witness 
recalls the events in issue, the need for notes or other materials 
prepared by opposing counsel is, thereby, eliminated.”169 Moreover, 
as noted, defendants’ claims that CWs have recanted, or that the 
allegations attributed in complaints to the CWs are inaccurate, often 
are meritless. A recent example is In re Barrick Gold Securities 
 
 166. Constabile v. Cty. of Westchester, 254 F.R.D. 160, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“Agents 
include those who are enlisted by legal counsel to perform investigative or analytical tasks 
to aid counsel in preparing for litigation.”) (citing Kayata v. Foote, Cone & Belding 
Worldwide, L.L.C., No. 99 CIV. 9022 VM KNF, 2000 WL 502859, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 
2000)).  
 167. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(A)(ii); see FTC v. Staples, Inc., Civ. Action No. 15-2115 
(EGS), 2016 WL 259642, at *3 (D.D.C. Jan. 21, 2016) (“‘[U]ndue hardship’ is generally 
found only in extreme circumstances such as unavailability due to death, brain injury or 
where a witness’s geographic location is beyond the court’s subpoena power.”) (citing 
EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK-PRODUCT 
DOCTRINE 927–32 (5th ed. 2007)).  
 168. See, e.g., In re Barrick Gold Sec. Litig., No. 13-cv-3851 (SAS), 2016 WL 1459674, 
at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2016). 
 169. A.I.A. Holdings, S.A. v. Lehman Bros., Inc., No. 97 Civ. 4978(LMM)(HB), 2002 
WL 31385824, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2002); see also Staples, Inc., 2016 WL 259642, at *3–
5 (denying motion to compel production of witness interview notes, because defendants 
could “interview or depose as many of the third parties that were interviewed or deposed 
by the Plaintiffs as desired”); SEC v. Neil, No. C 14-00122 WHA, 2014 WL 2931096, at *1, 
5 (N.D. Cal. June 27, 2014) (denying defendant’s request to compel production of raw 
notes and memoranda from SEC’s informal interviews with voluntary witnesses); SEC v. 
Stanard, No. 06 Civ. 7736 (GEL), 2007 WL 1834709, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2007) 
(rejecting claim of substantial need for interview notes because “[d]efendants are free to 
question each of the witnesses at their depositions, and at trial”). 
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Litigation.170 In that case, decided in 2016, the federal district judge 
denied defendants’ motion to compel the production of CW interview 
notes created by plaintiffs’ investigator after conducting an in camera 
inspection of the notes and determining that the amended complaint’s 
attributions to the CWs accurately reflected the contents of the 
notes.171 Overall, in most securities cases, courts should reject 
defendants’ efforts to overcome work product protection by showing 
substantial need for CW interview notes created by plaintiffs’ counsel 
and investigators. 
A fourth prong concerns whether plaintiffs waive the protection 
of the work product doctrine by selectively using CW interview notes 
as both a shield and a sword. It is well established that waiver can 
occur where a party makes “deliberate, affirmative, and selective use 
of work product” materials,172 and the use of such materials as both a 
shield and a sword can result in waiver.173 Here, the argument by 
defendants may be that if a CW allegedly recants, either before or 
during his deposition, and plaintiffs’ counsel then seeks to impeach 
the CW’s deposition testimony by using the investigator’s interview 
notes, this constitutes selective use of the notes as both a shield and a 
sword. This argument should fail, at least where the impeachment 
effort is limited to questioning the CW about the substance of his 
conversations with the investigator, rather than questioning the 
witness about the interview notes.174 If the CW is not questioned 
about the notes, there is no proscribed use of them as both a shield 
and a sword. 
A fifth prong is whether the work product doctrine protects the 
identities of those persons interviewed by an attorney or his agent in 
anticipation of litigation. While this has been described as an 
unsettled question,175 the better-reasoned decisions distinguish 
 
 170. No. 13-cv-3851 (SAS), 2016 WL 1459674 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2016). 
 171. Id. at *1, *3. 
 172. SEC v. Gupta, 281 F.R.D. 169, 173 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 173. See Seneca Ins. Co. v. Western Claims, Inc., 774 F.3d 1272, 1278 (10th Cir. 2014) 
(“[A] litigant cannot use the work product doctrine as both a sword and shield by 
selectively using the privileged documents to prove a point but then invok[e] the privilege 
to prevent an opponent from challenging the assertion.” (quoting Frontier Ref., Inc. v. 
Gorman-Rupp Co., 136 F.3d 695, 704 (10th Cir. 1998))); Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, No. 
11 Civ. 0691 (LAK) (JCF), 2013 WL 4045326, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2013) (applying the 
sword-shield doctrine and ordering production of documents). 
 174. See Constabile v. Cty. of Westchester, 254 F.R.D. 160, 167 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) 
(finding no proscribed use by plaintiffs of investigator’s report as both shield and sword, 
and therefore no waiver of work product protection). 
 175. See US Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. PHL Variable Ins. Co., Nos. 12 Civ. 6811(CM)(JCF), 
13 Civ. 1580(CM)(JCF), 2013 WL 5495542, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2013). 
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between discovery requests seeking an identification of persons 
knowledgeable about the adverse party’s claim or defenses from 
those seeking an identification of persons who have been contacted or 
interviewed by counsel concerning the case. The former requests are 
permissible, while the latter are not. They are impermissible because 
such requests seek to disclose the mental processes and strategic 
assessments of counsel.176 A sub-issue arises from a situation in which 
plaintiffs rely on a particular CW in an early iteration of their filed 
complaint, but remove references to that individual in a subsequent 
version of the complaint. If defendants seek disclosure of that CW’s 
identity, is that tantamount to seeking identification of persons who 
have been interviewed by counsel and therefore impermissible? At 
least one court has addressed this issue and concluded that the 
defendants’ request did not seek work product, because defendants 
merely sought the identity of a CW who plaintiffs identified in their 
initial complaint as someone with knowledge of their claims.177 It is 
not clear that this perspective is correct. All CWs in securities cases 
will have been interviewed by plaintiffs’ counsel or their investigators, 
so a discovery request seeking the identification of a CW included in 
an original complaint but then omitted from an amended complaint 
arguably does seek the identification of a witness interviewed by 
counsel or her agent. 
Overall, the discoverability of notes taken by plaintiffs’ counsel 
and/or investigators during the course of interviewing CWs pre-filing 
is another thorny issue in securities litigation. Defendants may seek 
these notes to discover impeachment material, or perhaps to covertly 
discover plaintiffs’ litigation strategy. Whatever the motive, such 
notes should be protected from disclosure in most cases by the 
attorney work-product doctrine, whether the interview was conducted 
by counsel or investigators retained by counsel on behalf of plaintiffs. 
 
 176. See, e.g., Hamilton v. RadioShack Corp., No. C 11-00888 LB, 2012 WL 2327191, at 
*2 (N.D. Cal. June 18, 2012) (denying motion to compel disclosure of witnesses who were 
interviewed by opposing counsel because disclosure would involve protected work 
product); Plumbers & Pipefitters Local 572 Pension Fund v. Cisco Sys., No. C01-20418, 
2005 WL 1459555, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 21, 2005) (identifying names of investigatory 
interviewees “would allow Defendants to infer the importance of these witnesses, 
revealing Plaintiff’s legal theories and conclusion[s]”); In re MTI Tech. Corp. Sec. Litig. II, 
No. SACV 00-0745 DOC, 2002 WL 32344347, at *3 (C.D. Cal. June 13, 2002) (“[T]he 
identity of witnesses interviewed by opposing counsel is protected . . . . [I]f the identity of 
interviewed witnesses is disclosed, opposing counsel can infer which witnesses counsel 
considers important, revealing mental impressions and trial strategy.”). 
 177. See Hatamian v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., No. 14-cv-00226-YGR (JSC), 
2015 WL 5604392, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2015). 
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CONCLUSION 
CWs play an essential role in securities class action litigation, as 
an unintended consequence of the PSLRA. The use of CWs by 
plaintiffs has generated a series of vexing issues. One set of issues 
concerns the use by companies of confidentiality, separation, and 
severance agreements to preclude or chill the opportunity for 
employees or former employees to be interviewed by plaintiffs’ 
counsel or investigators during the pre-filing phase of litigation. 
Courts should generally refuse to enforce these agreements on public 
policy grounds and consistent with the recent approach taken by the 
SEC under Rule 21F-17. A second set of issues concerns CWs who 
recant or are alleged to have recanted. Recanting is less common than 
defendants often assert and much of the recanting that does occur is 
the result of pressure exerted by defendants. Still, some recanting is 
genuine. Recanting likely could be minimized if plaintiffs’ counsel 
and investigators followed prudent guidance concerning CW 
interviews provided by Judge Engelmayer in a decision he issued in 
2015. Finally, the use of CWs raises a spectrum of issues concerning 
the discoverability of notes of CW interviews. In most situations those 
notes should be protected from discovery by the work product 
doctrine, whether the interview was conducted by counsel or 
counsel’s investigator. Courts generally should reject defendants’ 
efforts to overcome work product protection by arguing substantial 
need. Proscribed use by plaintiffs of the notes as both a shield and a 
sword can be avoided by careful counsel. Finally, the identities of 
those CWs who are interviewed by plaintiffs’ counsel or investigators 
should be protected by the work product doctrine. 
Notwithstanding the numerous problems created by the 
widespread reliance by plaintiffs on CWs in securities litigation, 
courts should not take steps that would significantly restrict their use. 
Given the obstacles imposed by the PSLRA, the opportunity to use 
CWs often represents the only viable opportunity for plaintiffs to 
survive a motion to dismiss. If this opportunity disappears, then 
private securities litigation may go with it. And that would be a 
tremendous disservice to the investing public. Plaintiffs’ lawyers no 
doubt have abused their use of CWs in multiple cases, but that 
abuse—exaggerated by defendants—does not justify some of the 
drastic remedial measures suggested by the defense bar. Alternative 
moderate steps are much more appropriate. 
 
 
